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Political imprisonment in Indonesia today 
"How many political prisoners are there in Indonesia?" A question frequently asked and impossible 
to answer with accuracy. An Indonesian non-government organisation (NGO) estimates that ·there ·are 
currently at least 2, 000 tapol (for tahanan politik meaning political prisoner). Many believe it could 
be far more. 
The government does not recognise the existence of 
political prisoners and feels no compunction to make 
information available. In the past few years, groups in 
Indonesia have been making concerted attempts to list the 
political prisoners by visiting the major prisons throughout 
the archipelago. The lists are not complete, but they do 
enable an analysis of a cross section of political prisoners 
in the country. 
While numbers of tapol do show the main areas of human 
rights abuses by the government in suppressing dissent, it 
cannot be forgotten that over the years countless numbers 
of people have been extra-judiciaJly executed, killed and 
"disappeared" usuaJly by the Indonesian armed forces 
(ABRI). Mass graves are known to exist in East Timor, 
Aceh and West Papua. 
General profile 
The profile is based on 596 identified tapol. Over half 
(53%) are imprisoned for the part they played in indepen-
dence movements in West Papua, Aceh and East Timar, 
while one third languish in jail because of their religious 
(Muslim) beliefs. Five ·percent were senten~d because of 
their political beliefs (aJleged communists) after the military 
coup of 1965 and subsequent communist purges. 
All these arrests, detentions and trials abuse the provisions 
in Articles 9 to 23 of the 1976 International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights: detention for religious and 
political beliefs (Articles 18 and 19); for acts of peaceful 
assembly (Article 21); subjecting people to arbitrary arrest 
(Article 9); delayed trials and withholding legal assistance 
(Article 14); and terrorising families and screening mail and 
telephones (Article 17). Torture and the use of confessions 
extracted under torture have been widely reported. 
The inhumane treatment of detainees and prisoners shows 
Indonesia's blatant lack of respect for the Universal Declar-
ation on Human Rights (Universal Declaration) and the 
United Nation's Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment 
of Prisgners (Minimum Rules) adopted in 1955. This scorn 
is further revealed by the promotion of a "Southern" 
DecJaration of Human Rights to chaJlenge the UN 
document (see "NAM s ·ummit: a step back for human 
rights" in this issue). 
Aside from names and places of detention (largely in 
Java), details on tapol are patchy. In East Timor and West 
Papua, often only the name of the prisoner is known. In 
Java, details including date of and reason for arrest, length 
of sentence and supposed release date may be available. Of 
course, by section 7 of the Minimum Rules details of all 
prisoners should be registered on arrival. 
The justification for the incarceration of twenty six names 
appearing on the lists are unknown and NGOs have been 
unable to contact them on prison visits. Some prisoners are 
still awaiting trial: two years after their arrest. 
Profile: West Papuan tapol 
There are 144 identified tapol currently in prison accused 
of subversion because of their struggle for an independent 
West Papua; charges based largely on involvement in the 
independence movement Organisasi Papua Merdeka 
(OPM). 
Arrest and sentencing of these prisoners centre around five 
major "incidents", including the flag raising ceremony of 14 
December 1988 declaring the independence of Western 
Melanesia and the commemoration event for those 
imprisoned one year later. Fifty four percent of sentences 
stretch for between 5 and 10 years, while twenty-one tapol 
have sentences between 10 and 20 years. The majority are 
aged between 22 and 40. 
The most striking fact is that over haJf (54%) are 
imprisoned in Java, many thousands of miles away from 
their homes, families and friends. There is only the 
remotest possibility for families to visit them. This violates 
section 37 of the Minimum Rules which provides that 
prisoners should be allowed to communicate with their 
family at regular intervals both by Jetter and by receiving 
visits. 
Other facts which emerge are that fifty-seven tapol were 
detained with no evidence of an arrest warrant; of the 
arrests made on 5 December 1990 in connection with the 
fust anniversary of the Independence Declaration, six 
remain untried; and six tapol remain in military prisons. 
. . . 
The case of the "W AINGGAI family Js extraordinary: .· 
. nine mem~rs have been imprisoned ·for their · aJfe-· 
. . p!Jy subversive activities. Dr Thomas Wainggai 
was sentenced .. to · 20 years for organising the flag ·. 
raising ceremony in Jayapura on 14 December 1988; 
·where ·he iitade a ·statement declaring the indepen...;; .. · 
dence of the state of Western Mel~esia. HiS wife;> 
· Teruko was sentenced to 8 yeats for sewing the t1ag. · 
Both were moved to prisons in Java (Cipinang and 
Tangerang respectively). 
While 28 year ·old• Yance and 40 ·year old Nicolas 
received 7 a.Rd · S years respectively for their part in 
commemorating 1he flag raising ceremony in . 1989, 
·· Uo8atd Wainggai, ·aged 57,· received.5·.years ·. anct ·8· · 
months fordeserting:from the Indonesian army. Four 
other family membels were inciicerated for 1ilikliown. 
~: (JilCely 10' . be in = connectiosf Wjth tM.· flag 
. · r~ ~mony) for periods between t · 1/2 aiid 7 .·· 
~ Paulina. Wainggai is knoWJi •to ··· h&vc ·been · 
released. · · · 
Profile: Communist Party tapol 
The military coup of 1965 led to the merciless and bloody 
massacre of an estimated one million people suspected of 
being members or sympathisers of the PKI (Partai Komunis 
Indonesia: PKI). At the same time over 750,000 suspected 
communists were detained, many of whom were arbitrarily 
executed. Of those who survived the purge, less than a 
thousand were tried. Almost all were sentenced to over ten 
years. Some were sentenced to death or imprisoned for life. 
During the late 1970s many were released under a general 
amnesty but since 1985 22 suspected communists, aJJ of 
whom bad been on death row for nearly 20 years, have 
been executed. 
At least twenty-nine political prisoners, accused of 
involvement in the 1965 coup attempt, remain in prison. 
Nine were originally sentenced to death: in 1980 the 
sentences of two were commuted to life imprisonment. 
Seven are still waiting on death row after up to 24 years in 
prison. Seventeen have been sentenced to life imprison-
ment, fifteen of whom were imprisoned between 1965 and 
1968. 
Commutation of sentences and release is subject to the 
whim of President Suharto. In August 1991, Ponke Princen 
of the Institute for the Defence of Human Rights (LPHAM 
supplied a list of political prisoners whose releases are all 
long overdue; 17 on that list are definitely still in prison. 
Why? By a Decree of 1950, after serving 5 years, life 
sentences were automatically reduced to 20 years, but in 
1987 Suharto granted himself total discretion over the fate 
of political prisoners. After the 1987 act, commutation is 
no longer automatic and can only be obtained if Suharto 
decides it is politicaUy expedient (see TAPOL Bulletin No. 
107, October 1991). 
The majority of the lifers were either due to be released 
in the late 1980s or Suharto himself reduced life sentences 
to twenty years (such as prisoners Sutan Pasaribu, Atmo, 
Pumomo and Sunari) so making their release imminent; yet 
they remain in jail to this day. 
Most of these prisoners are elderly: twenty-four are over 
60 years old. Kamba al Haji Aji Kamba, incarcerated in 
Sulawesi since 1965, is over 91 years old. He was sen-
tenced to life and expected to be released in the late 1980s. 
Suharto must still consider him to be very dangerous. 
Profile: Muslim tapol 
Muslim activists make up 36 percent of the total, by far the 
largest group. 212 Muslim activists are identified by name 
and are serving up to life sentence for subversion. · How-
ever, estimates are that there are at least 100 more. 
Information about these tapol is very sparse. The reasons 
for arrest and imprisonment are in direct contravention of 
Articles 18 (freedom of religion), 19 (freedom of express-
ion) and 20 (freedom of peaceful assembly) of the Univer-
sal Declaration. Amnesty International considers at least 50 
to be prisoners of conscience, held for the non-violent 
exercise of their religious beliefs (AI: Indonesia/East Timor: 
The Suppression of Dissent. July 1992). Muslim resis-
tance to adopting Pancasila as their sole principle formed 
the basis of the confrontations between Suharto and Muslim 
~ctivists. Having · been the targets of military death squads 
ID the early 1980s, Muslim communities were intimidated 
by the military to crush i:esistance to a bill enforcing 
acceptance of its sole ideology law. This led to the 
Tanjung Priok massacre in September 1984, the most brutal 
operation of the regime against the Muslim community (see 
"Indonesia: Muslims on Trial", TAPOL, 1987). Hundreds 
were killed or wounded and the massacre provided the 
springboard for a whole series of trials which began in 
January 1985. Many are still in jail today. 
The lists name seven preachers who were arrested after 
the Tanjung Priok massacre and given sentences from 14 to 
20 ye~rs. '!en with sentences of 10 to 20 years, accused of 
bombIDgs ID Jakarta, ~al~g (East Java) and Borobudur 
(Central Java), along with nIDe others are in jail for subver-
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sion. More than forty were then arrested and convicted 
between January and August 1986 for their involvement 
with Usroh , groups, which advocate closer ties amongst 
Muslims and stricter adherence to Muslim teachings. Their 
sentences range from 7 years to life imprisonment. Another 
spate of Usroh detentions took place in 1987, with nine 
serving 7 to 15 years. 
Muslims have also been persecuted and tried because of 
their former involvement with the Darul Islam (a movement 
for the creation of an Islamic state dating back to the late 
1940s, which was launched by Sekarmadji Kartosuwirjo ). 
This was part of a plot to undermine Muslim activists 
masterminded by a leading inteJiigence officer of the 
regime in the late 1970s ("Indonesia: Muslims on Trial" 
TAPOL, 1987. p 15). Thirteen have been in jail since 1981, 
with sentences between 9 and 20 years, while another set of 
Tony Ardie, sentenced to 9 years in 1986, for giving inflamma-
tory sermons. 
prosecutions occurred in 1986/87, leaving twenty-five in 
prison with sentences from 10 to 20 years. In 1989/90, 
twenty-four others were sentenced to between 4 and 10 
years, accused of undermining Pancasila and attempting to 
establish an Islamic state. Three Muslims arrested in 1990 
remain untried (see box). 
In that same period the Lampung affair added a further 
nineteen to the list of Muslims detained for their religious 
beliefs: six have life sentences and seven between 10 and 
20 years. 
In many cases, only the name of the detained person is 
known: the sentence is unknown in 75 percent of cases, age 
is unknown in 80 percent, and expected release date or the 
whereabouts of family are unknown in over 90 percent. 
Profile: East Timor tapol 
There are over 120 East Timorese known to be held for 
Two years in prison without- trial ---7~ · ~~­
- Hasan Tito (aged 28) father of two, Jayus bin l<arn!o r 
· (aged 36) ~d StametS~adL(~3) were arre.s~ m 
June 1990 and May 1990 respectively and to thiS ~ 
thefr 'families have not beentold the reasonJor ~ . 
--- detelitiOJi ot ·whether they ·have been charged and ·· 
tried All efforts by .the Indonesian Legal Aid Fo11n-
. datiori (YLBHI) to see th~ir cnent8 have so far fa~~ --· 
(KompaS, 26 August 1992). After over 2 ye:ns, '~>-­
. families helve onJy been told oratly that their h1Js-. ;:;. 
ban& are being held for tbeit involvement in ~ -}j 
-"bloody .incident" in Talang Sari, . Way Jepara; Iiuh~ if 
. pnrig~ -. Hasan · Tito's -involvement was taking ·in ~o. !:? 
· >'children orphaned after __ the massacre. . . The families 
have receivtd 00 ootification of'.afi'est 8nd . 00.tentiOO. 
',:~a-=;;~~a ,, 
·-. February 1989. The self-sUffic1ent Islamic fannlJlg fa 
community was accused by J~l military forces .or- .L 
~s~g Pan~sila a8 ·_ regards r~ligion and labeJ1Cd -_ '·'.' 
i:ehgmus fanat1CS~ . __ -.. .· . . -. _ . . _ _ ;11 
-· The . acc•tions culminated in .· a . slaughter qfJbe . L 
vilJagerS. · Th.e . ~tus and _ JegaJ authorlty of 'tllC fk 
._ .. military in <:a1rying ·oot the mass killings has n¢yer 
.··. been Clarified nor has the number of victims' evet 
. been confum~. . .... ·_. . . . . .·. . .. · . .. . - .· . . ... 
- - fn May _and June 1990~ t~ ·tlU"ee men were arrested 
t,iE~S!t~:~, an 
· ·. · div1dUaJ charged With subvmion may be heldfor .• -.... 
. ·.·.·· .•. to· three months .· WitJiOut. :· triaJ, . Wliile omy i•~ . y 
1·; 
E:; Hasan. ne· KORBM 043 -- ba refused :t0givc any -· '' 
· .. ·. ilifomiation 10 Jafu3' family, teAing 1hCJn .that "Jayus' 
CaS'e .will lie Clarified after ms trial in court" (YIJml._ . _ .•. _ 
''News andA.ctibn", No I, June1992). · . __ · · . 
. ht the meetiiigs which have taken . pla~ --Hilsan - T.itQ · 
his said he has beell tortuied: psychological · mamna 
. and paranoia now _afflict him~ Slamet 'SUl'yadi lias . 
.. aiso· .said that he h8s ·been tortured. 
alleged subversion, which represents at least 22 percent of 
the total tapol held by the Indonesian regime. Reports are 
that there are far more. It is not even clear that Indonesian 
law has any jurisdiction over the East Timorese since 
Indonesia illegally annexed the country in 1975. 
Whether or not this is so, these arrests have violated the 
human rights of the detainees, who have been subjected to 
torture, have had legal advice withheld, family visits denied, 
experienced long periods of detention without charge, and 
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unfair triaJs. 
The paucity of information on East Timorese tapol is 
shocking. It is basically impossible for anyone to visit 
prisoners in East Timor. Consequently, out of the 120 
known prisoners, the ages of over ninety and the sentences 
(~sentenced at all) of ninety-four are unknown. For many 
pnsoners, not even the family name is known. The lists 
mention at least seven tapol held in KODIM 1628 (Baucau) 
who have not been identified at all. 
Only nine are currently in prison in Jakarta (including the 
four sentenced after the demonstration in Jakarta last Nov-
ember): however, looking at the situation with the West 
Papuan tapol, it is possible that many of these will be 
transferred to Java. 
Elida Carvalho Monteiro, a 17 year old schoolgirl, 
is currently incarcerated in the district of Viqueque. 
She was raped by an Indonesian soldier from Battal-
ion 403, Sergeant Imam. In February 1992, she was 
already 6 months pregnant: it is unknown if this 
pregnancy resulted from the rape. The reason for and 
length of her detention is unknown. 
From the information we do have, it is clear that the vast 
majority of the detainees are young: out of the twenty-nine 
tapol whose ages we know, five are under 21 years of age, 
twenty between 22 and 40, and four between 41 and 60. 
The majority are detained for Fretilin activities (including 
Manuel Corvalho, arrested early 1991, reportedly still in prison. 
He is one of the many hundreds of Timorese who are in and out 
of tktention. 
the other four held in Cipinang Prison, Jakarta since 1984, 
with sentences ranging from 12 to 17 years). Membership 
of or sympathy with FretiJin is equated to subversion and 
sentences are heavy, so enabling Indonesia to keep "trou-
blesome elements out of mainstream society". 
Profile: Acehnese tapol 
We have the names of 52 Acehnese tapol incarcerated for 
their association or involvement with the Aceh Freedom 
Movement (Aceh Merdeka). Sentencing has been draco-
nian. Two have received life, four have 20 year sentences 
and fifteen between 11 and 15 years. Sentences of between 
5 and 10 years have been meted out to eighteen Acehnese. 
Sentences for the other twelve are unknown. 
The majority of those convicted are aged between 22 and 
40 and their occupations and status cover a diverse spec-
trum. Among them are intellectuals and soldiers as well as 
government officials and smaJJ businessmen. 
The sad truth is, like in so many of the independence 
struggles, the majority of activists (or suspected activists) 
do not get to prison. Many thousands of dead have been 
buried in mass graves or were simply left on the roads after 
purges by Indonesian troops. Little wonder the Acehnese 
refugees holed up in the Embassy in Malaysia refuse to be 
repatriated (see "Acehnese refugees in Malaysian dungeons" 
in this issue). 
Profile: Student tapol 
There are 10 students currently known as being held for 
their political activities in Indonesia. Their cases have been 
reported in previous TAPOL bulJetins but their detentions 
clearly flaunt the freedom of expression and assembly 
provisions of the Universal Declaration. * 
Sources 
List of tapol prepared by an NGO in Indonesia in February 
1992; List of West Papuan tapol prepared by ABU BILD of 
the LBH Jayapura, September 1991; List of Muslim tapoJ 
at Nusakambangan Prison, Cilacap in Central Java prepared 
by a tapol; Lists of East Timorese and Acehnese tapol kept 
by TAPOL. 




ACEH: Free Aceh Movement: 1989 52 8.72 
PKI: Membership of Indonesian 
Communist Party: 1965 31 5.20 
MUSLIM: 212 35.67 
WEST PAPUA: Subversion charges 
and membership of OPM 144 24.16 
STUDENTS: 10 1.68 
EAST TIMOR: Subversion charges 
and membership of Fretilin: 1975 120 20.21 
CASE BASIS FOR IMPRISON-
MENT UNKNOWN 26 4.36 
TOTAL -- --
596 100 
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Military, reshuffling the cards 
Events in neighbouring Thailand where the army~ role is being eroded have had their impact in 
Jakarta. A discussion about the role of ABRI, the Indonesian armed forces, is taking place along with 
a major turnover at the top of ABRI. Rifts between ABRI and the ruling party GOLKAR have come into 
the open. 
The role of the armed forces in Thailand is receding fast 
following the recent general elections. But the situation in 
Indonesia is still some way behind. As in Thailand, ABRI 
has played and continues to play a crucial role in 
Indonesian social, political and economic life. Dwifungsi 
(Dual Function) is the ABRI doctrine legitimising the 
military role in every sector of society, enabling the army 
to perform a military and a non-military role. In the first 
two decades of the New Order, Dual Function was applied 
everywhere. The 'civic mission' of ABRI, known as kek-
aryaan or sospol (from sosial politik), enabled numerous 
officers to become cabinet ministers, directors of state and 
private firms, governors, district, subdistrict and village 
heads, MPs and so on. Both the military and the sospol 
wings have undergone development and changes. 
The military wing 
In 1983 the armed forces underwent a major reorganisation, 
rejuvenation and professionalisation. Under Generals Benny 
Murdani and Rudini, both hailing from the era bridging the 
1945 generation involved in the struggle for independence 
and the generation of the AMN (military academy), a 
streamlined ABRI emerged. 
Almost a decade later, another major overhaul is occur-
ring. While the structure has remained intact, an unprece-
dented reshuffle has taken place. Re-postings usually occur 
routinely every two or three years. But this time a record 37 
generals and some 30 · colonels were promoted or shifted. 
Military analysts see this move as necessary for securing 
stability in preparation for the March 1993 session of the 
MPR (People's Congress) which will appoint the next presi-
dent. 
It is a public secret that Suharto's relationship with 
Cilangkap (ABRI headquarters) has deteriorated. Suharto's 
inner core of confidants in the sixties and seventies con-
sisted mainly of military while today Suharto relies almost 
solely on technocrats and business cronies. The coming five 
years will be decisive for Suharto (and his family). Differ-
ent scenarios have been suggested but everybody expects 
Suharto to stand for another term. The overhaul in ABRI 
was needed to safeguard political and military conditions. 
Suharto's position depends largely on his placing the most 
vital army jobs in the hands of men he can trust, an 
increasingly difficult task for the aging dictator. Many 
warriors of his generation have died; others have been 
alienated or have become adversaries. Despite their para-
mount position in society, Indonesian generals have not 
become a military caste. Most of their offspring have joined 
the ranks of the aspiring entrepreneurial class. The younger 
generation of AMN graduates come from a wide social 
background and the present top echelon of Cilangkap 
consists· predominantly of officers whose loyalty to the 
president is at the very least questionable. It is therefore no 
accident that in the past two years, the conflict between 
Suharto and Cilangkap has been dominated by the delicate 
issue of promotions and transfers. Since 1983 there have 
been serious efforts by the ABRI leadership to appoint the 
right man in the right place and a database keeps track of 
all officers, identifying those suitable for senior positions. 
The president, as Panglima Tertinggi (Supreme Commander 
of the armed forces), must endorse every promotion or 
transfer of an officer and, although he usually approves the 
candidates, the number of difficulties have increased. 
Key positions 
Obviously, Suharto will always hand pick Pangab, the 
commander-in-chief of ABRL In the first years of his 
reign, Suharto held the presidency and Pangab as well as 
the position of minister of defence. In 1971, when he felt 
more secure, General Maraden Panggabean held the top 
post in ABRL The colourless Panggabean had one out-
standing feature: staunch loyalty to Suharto. In 1978 
Suharto replaced him with General Mohammad Yusuf who 
had been a cabinet minister and had been out of active 
military duty for twelve years. Suharto knew that these 
non-Javanese generals were not in a position to challenge 
his authority. In 1983 Suharto again picked a staunch 
loyalist, General Benny Murdani, as Pangab. Murdani was 
also something of an outsider: he had never held an 
important territorial post and was a skilful intelligence 
operator. Being Javanese, Murdani was potentially more of 
a threat than pre.vious Pangab which is probably why he 
. enermJVismoyo Arismunandar, the rising star from the 
'politically correct' family. He has been mentioned as the future 
Indonesian president. 
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did not occupy the position of defence minister as well 
Suharto's suspicions were correct. The two drifted apart 
and, as defence minister, Murdani is now regarded as a 
threat to Suharto. In 1988, Suharto appointed his former 
aide General Try Sutrisno as Pangab. Again loyalty was 
Sutrisno's major asset: however, because he comes from 
army engineer ranks, his hold over the other generals 
always remained marginal. 
Suharto now has problems finding loyalists to fill the top 
positions in ABRI. His only option is to appoint his former 
aides who today are the chief-of-police General Kunarto, 
the air force chief Marshal Siboen and Major-General 
Kentot Harseno, military commander of Metropolitan 
Jakarta. 
New appointments 
In the recent reshuffle, some positions have been left 
untouched, notably the Pangab and the key post of chief-
of-staff of social and political affairs. The new Pangab wiJJ 
be crucial. According to past procedure the present army 
chief-of-staff, General Eddy Sudradjat, should be 
appointed. He has all the qualifications for the job particu-
larly as a member of the elite red berets who has held 
several important territorial positions. But Sudradjat 
The Indonesian army facing no external threat, functions mainly 
as security apparatus against any domestic protest. 
represents the Cilangkap group and is not a Suharto 
loyalist. As vice-chief-of-staff, Suharto has appointed his 
brother-in-law, Lt.General Wismoyo Arismunandar. Few 
doubt that Wismoyo will become Pangab in the near future. 
Political analysts in Jakarta speculate that General Eddy 
Sudradjat, now reaching retirement age (55 years) will leave 
the scene to pave the way for Wismoyo to become Pangab 
next November. 
Another bottleneck is the position of Kassospol, chief-of-
staff of social and political affairs. Lt.General Harsudiono 
Hartas has been in this position for four years, which is a 
remarkably long time. It is widely acknowledged that 
Suharto has tried to appoint somebody else but so far 
Cilangkap has insisted on retaining Hartas. However, a 
compromise wilJ have to be found soon since Hartas is 
already two years above retirement age. 
The Civil wing 
Although fewer than in the seventies, the number of ABRI 
posted in Sospol posts is high: 12 of the 27 governors are 
ABRI men, as are 134 of the 299 district heads and 
hundreds of village-heads. In addition, many thousands of 
ABRI personnel function as top civil servants, managers 
and directors of state and private companies. Twelve 
cabinet ministers are retired army officers, including home 
affairs, defence, oil and energy, transmigration and cooper-
atives and there are 100 (20%) appointed ABRI members 
in Parliament along with another 114 members in the MPR 
(Peoples Congress). These positions are coordinated by the 
Kassospol which shows how powerful this position is: the 
holder has a decisive say in the appointment of military 
men to any job. 
The army's sospol function dates back to the fifties when 
officers were frustrated because social and poJiticaJ affairs 
were decided solely by politicians. In the late fifties, army 
officers started emerging as cabinet ministers and the 
military became a political and economic force. Since the 
military takeover in 1965, the Dwifungsi role of ABRI has 
predominated. Any major decision today can only be 
implemented with the consent of Cilangkap. 
Drastic changes 
Despite the political stalemate, there have been drastic 
changes. A striking development is the rift between Golkar 
and ABRI and also that some civilians have started to 
question the dominant role . of ABRI. Last, but not least, 
Suharto has sought to erode the mle of Cilangkap in 
political affairs. 
It was ABRI that gave birth to the monstrosity called 
Golkar. Initially intended as an anti-communist front, in the 
late sixties Suharto and his inner core decided to use 
Golkar as their political vehicle. While Suharto enjoyed the 
almost complete support of ABRI, Golkar remained the 
shared baby of Bina Graha (the presidential office) and 
ABRI. 
In the latter half of the eighties when conflicts between 
Suharto and ABRI became apparent, Golkar became an 
arena of conflict. ABRI chief, Benny Murdani, decided 
during the 1987 elections to back the obscure PDI 
(Indonesian Democracy Party) as a signal that ABRI was 
distancing itself from the executive and the ruling power. 
This line has been continued by Lt. General Harsudiono 
Hartas and ABRI's relationship with the Golkar leadership 
has cooled. While stating publicly that ABRI is neutral and 
stands above all groupings, General Hartas is moulding 114 
members of the People's Congress into a separate faction in 
the Golkar group. Although Suharto has the final say in 
Golkar, the ruling party now consists of different wings 
with their own interests and programmes. This helps explain 
why Suharto is trying to fmd other political platforms to 
secure his position, not least among the Muslims. 
Defiance against ABRI 
In the last few months a new debate has emerged in Jakarta 
about implementing Dwifungsi. Two weJJ-known academics 
proposed a reduction in the 100 ABRI seats in parliament: 
proposal which would have been unthinkable a few years 
back. Although far from revolutionary, it reflects the 
discontent in Indonesian society about ABRI's dominance 
in all levels of society. Many retired officers now agree that 
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there should be a gradual decrease of Dwifungsi in society, 
not least among them being Suharto, who regards ABRI as 
his most dangerous adversary. For example, Suharto is now 
using technocrats and businessmen as advisers to capitalise 
from the Pacific Rim economic boom instead of military. 
As a result, ABRI has lost a lot of economic clout in the 
last ten years. To try to catch up, ABRI want training 
officers to attend MBA courses and join corporations run 
by the army. 
It is not clear whether there will be a showdown between 
Bina Graha and Cilanglaip. There are many factors which 
will determine whether the conflict intensifies or ends in 
compromise. 
National consensus 
The Indonesian army has always had a high profile in 
political affairs. During the independence struggle of 1945-
1950, the army consisted. predominantly of ill-trained 
youngsters, a far cry from a professional army. The recruits 
came from many social backgrounds, whilst the officers 
originated from the priyayi, the aristocracy of Javanese 
society as did political leaders. It was therefore no accident 
that in the fifties military officers continued to be active in 
politics, together with p<'>liticians from the same back-
ground. In fact, the political outlook of the average military 
man reflected the political contours; nationalist, Muslim, 
socialist, communist etc. In those liberal days, sections of 
the army were involved in many national events such as 
coup d'etat attempts and rebellions against the central 
government. 
This all changed in 1965. When Suharto took over, a 
thorough purge of ABRI was implemented. Many thousands 
MILITARY 
of officers and soldiers were sacked, imprisoned, convicted 
or murdered: Suharto knew well the dangers of a politically 
active armed forces. In 1969, Suharto secured an agreement 
with civilians and military called the Konsensus Nasional, 
which was an agreement to keep the military out of elec-
toral politics while allocating ABRI 10 per cent of the seats 
in parliament. It was argued that if the military were 
allowed to vote, a situation like the fifties would emerge, 
with the military backing this or that grouping. The Konse-
nsus Nasional has worked in Suharto's favour. The fifties 
situation is seen as a nightmare by the average ABRI 
officer: an ABRI split into many factions and involved in 
rebellions has no place in the days of the professional 
soldier. 
Dissatisfaction among officers is widespread, particularly 
because of the wealth amassed by the Suharto family. But 
the Konsensus Nasional reminds them to steer clear of 
taking action. The pledge is a buffer protecting Suharto and 
his family. No one in the military wants to be accused of 
acting unconstitutionally . . Everybody is waiting for some-
body else to make the first strike. tr 
Indonesia signals Yes to the Hawks 
For months, the national and specialist press have been anticipating the finalisation of Indonesia 'a 
cont~act for British Aerospace Hawk fighter jets. On 19 September, the signing of the contract was 
officially announced in Jakarta. Yet in Britain, no one was saying anything. 
Antara, the Indonesian news agency, reported chief-of-
staff, Air Marshall Siboen, the most senior man in the 
Indonesian air force, as saying that the contract for the 
purchase of 24 Hawk fighters had been signed on . 10 
September in London. That was the first day of the 
Farnborough Air Show. 
British Aerospace, however, denied that any such contract 
was signed, confirming only that a memorandum of 
understanding (MoU) was signed at Farnborough between 
the Indonesian and UK governments. The MoU envisages 
"continuing work and involvement between the two 
countries, and the anticipation of potential further sales of 
Hawk aircraft to Indonesia" according to Robert Gardner, 
vice-president of public relations at BAe. 
The Ministry of Defence have confinned that they signed 
a supplement to the MoU at Farnborough, concerning 
assistance and training. 
Yet Antara's report in Jakarta was quite specific: the 
contract was for the purchase of 14 Hawk-100 Hawk 
(trainer/fighter) aircraft and 10 Hawk-200 fighters. 
The Hawk deal was first envisaged last June in a MoU 
between BAe and IPTN, the Indonesian state aerospace 
company, which set out the two parties' general needs and 
aspirations. [TAPOL Bulletin, No. 106 August 1991] The 
next stage of the deal would be a more specific MoU to 
buy the aircraft, probably detailing the actual number to be 
bought. This seems now to have been signed. 
But whether or not it was more than a MoU that was 
signed at Farnborough, British Aerospace will not say until 
the opportunity is right for maximum publicity. 1< 
Land Rover is not for farmers! 
Baroness Trumpington, a minister at the Foreign 
Office, speaking in the House of Lords on 16 July, in 
answer to Lord Judd who had protested at the use of 
~d Rovers in East Timor, pooh-poohed his anger, 
saying: "My farmer friends would laugh . . . to think 
that they were offensive weapons". She could hardly 
have known that her words had been demolished by 
BAe, which now manufactures the vehicle, when it 
bought up British Leyland several years ago. 
A~rding to BAe sales literature: "Land Rover plus 
Rapier. Two of the wodd's most successful pieces of 
defence hardware now come from the same stable." 
You couldn't have it straighter than that, m'Lady! .\' 
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CONFERENCE REPORT 
Suharto and the Non-aligned Summit 
The Non-aligned Movement (NAM) Summit in Jakarta was the most prestigious international ev~nt 
since Suharto came into power. Everything was mobilised to make the conference a success. The first 
week of September was a week the public of Jakarta will not easily for~et, not. least b~cali:se of the 
security measures. The media was required cover the event ad nauseam; internationally it was largely 
ignored. 
Even before the Summit had begun, the trouble started. The 
membership of Yugoslavia (more precisely Serbia and 
Montenegro), which chaired NAM in the preceding three-
year period, was challenged by Muslim countries which 
threatened to stay away if the meeting was opened by 
Yugoslavia. After days of heated dispute, Indonesia reached 
a compromise; the hand-over of the chairmanship would 
take place before the conference started. 
Numerically, the Summit was impressive with member-
ship swollen to 110 countries. But from the outset the 
summit was plagued by the question: what is the role of the 
movement now that the cold war has ended? With many 
leading lights staying at home - India's Rao, Cuba's Castro, 
Egypt's Mubarak, Syria's Assad, fraq's Saddam Hussein, 
Libya's Gaddafi, Brasil's Collor and Argentina's Menem -
the summit was a second rate event. 
UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali told the 
meeting that NAM stiJJ has a contribution to make, in 
helping the UN create a 'new world order' based on multi-
lateralism and international democracy and by remaining 
faithful to its basic principles. Suharto responded, promising 
to use his chairmanship to boost the Movement (and his 
personal ambitions) on the international arena. His appear-
ance at the UN General Assembly which he will address on 
24 September, as chair of NAM, marks his first appearance 
at the world body. 
First and second class NAM members 
The feud over the suspension of Yugoslavia and how to 
respond to the persecution of Bosnian Muslims remained 
central to the discussions, much to the dismay of African 
delegates who felt that the socio-economic disasters in their 
continent were being ignored. The division between the 
richer and poorer NAM members was clear: Countries like 
Malaysia, not shackled by World Bank and IMF dictates, 
could afford to become the mouthpiece of the South, 
attacking ·the double standards of the rich North, while the 
majority of NAM members, dependent on foreign aid, can 
hardly afford to voice criticism, afraid of repercussions. 
Suharto reflects a new kind of NAM leadership. A boring 
speaker in contrast with NAM founders like Sukarno, 
Nasser or Nkrumah, Suharto was also seen as suspiciously 
pro-Western. The 'punishment' of Holland some months 
ago was a master-stroke by Suharto and seen by many in 
the third world as a principled act of defiance. 
Suharto is determined to use the NAM leadership to 
enhance his international posture but whether this will 
succeed is stiJJ questionable. The NAM Summit Jacked 
internal coherence; the more radical anti-US NAM mem-
bers are hardly likely to recognise Suharto as their 
spokesperson. The human rights record of Indonesia 
remains one of the worst and the East Timor issue will 
haunt Suharto in any international platform. 
Heavy-handed security 
Nothing was spared. US $200 million was spent to renovate 
the conference facilities, improve roads and luxury hotel 
suite, and plant grass and trees. People spoke cynically of 
a tree being planted for every beggar made to 'disappear' off 
the streets for the benefit of the visitors. A tunnel was built 
connecting the hotel and the conference venue, along which 
to transport the participants in small electric cars. A fleet of 
bullet-proof Mercedes limousines was imported. Two 
thousand families in nearby Kampung Sawah were evicted 
and their homes demolished to turn the area into a green 
zone for the Summit. Two weeks before the honoured 
guests started arriving, the displaced families staged angry 
demonstrations, giving the twist of reality to a message dis-
played on one office building: "Through NAM we wiJJ fight 
against poverty." 
Major-General Arie Sudewo with some of the NAM security 
troops. 
Unnoticed by the foreign guests were the security 
measures surrounding NAM. For months, 15,000 military 
received special training to safeguard the conference, and 
Major-General Kentot Harseno, the Jakarta military 
commander, warned potential demonstrators not to contem-
plate launching any protest as his troops were under orders 
to shoot. Eighty per cent of the security troops were in 
plain-clothes but their presence was obvious to the trained 
observer. The offices of human rights organisations Jike 
Infight and SKEPHI were placed under close surveillance 
some weeks before the event. Anyone entering had to 
register, the phones were cut and nearby photocopying 
facilities were also watched. 
A new traffic law which had provoked widespread 
condemnation was postponed for one year because the 
government feared that protest demonstrations would cause 
mayhem on the streets of Jakarta during the Summit. The 
continued on page 17 
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NAM Summit: A step back for human rights 
The references to human rights in the final document of the Non-aligned Summit ~eld in Jakarta. in 
September have provoked criticism from human rights organisations in Indonesia. The f ollo_wmg 
extracts are from articles by Dr. T. Mulya Lubis, Director of the Centre for the Study of Human Rzghts, 
Jakarta. 
The formulation of basic human rights in The Jakarta 
Message published recently by the Non-aligned Summit is 
not a step forward and can even be said to be a step back 
because it echoes the classic debate of forty years ago when 
there was a clash between the principle of universality and 
the principle of locality. 
The controversy between these two principles proved to 
be sterile so why resuscitate it when we hoped that the 
Non-aligned Movement would come up with new standards 
of human rights? This is not the time to return to fruitless 
debate: it is an incontrovertible fact that human rights are 
universal. 
The principles of national sovereignty and non-
interference have been raised in connection with human 
rights but they cannot be allowed to undermine the 
principle of human rights in each country. The principles 
cannot be used as a pretext to abuse human rights. 
The fact that The Jakarta Message acknowledges the 
existence of individual rights alongside collective rights is 
a step forward. But collective rights are given exaggerated 
importance while individual rights are glossed over. Such 
an attitude towards human rights is quite erroneous. There 
are no grounds for regarding these two rights as 
contradictory; rather they are interdependent. Collective 
rights must be supported by individual rights and individual 
rights must be backed by collective rights. 
We ought to be formulating new standards for human 
rights and not returning to the past. New formulations are 
needed for the UN World Conference on Human Rights 
next year yet we are stuck into debating barren formulations 
which are one-sided and unholistic. 
As for the question of economic aid and human rights, as 
far as I can see, there is no such thing as disinterested 
economic aid. No economic aid is given without conditions 
attached, be they human rights, democratisation or the 
environment. It is naive for us to raise such questions; it is 
up to those who give the aid to set the conditions .... 
The rejection of intervention as set forth in the final 
document of the NAM Summit is also inconsistent. In some 
respects, the principle of non-intervention is legitimate but 
this certainly does not apply to human rights abuses. It is 
the responsibility of the international community to 
intervene. If not, how could we possibly deal with the fate 
of people in Bosnia and Somalia? We cannot allow the 
things being experienced by the citizens of those two 
countries to continue .... [Media Indonesia, 14.09.1992) 
The Jakarta Message gives priority to social and 
economic rights over civil and political rights. This is an 
outdated approach revered by those economists who 
believed in the 'trickle-down' theory, which argued that 
non-economic benefits would come once development had 
been achieved. The fact that economic development was 
achiev.ed by undemocratic and non-participatory means was 
ignored. The human rights literature regards this approach 
·The Jakarta Message :9n human rights 
·. s; 1bis
0
rtew era fuin~a~~al relations .•. (should 
. be) dedicated to the promotion of fundamental ~ghts 
. and freedoms of huntan beinp as well as of nations. 
. .. :, We must .®sure re~'for the,sovereignty of nations . 
. and the Strict adherence to 'the principle of ntin-
futerfercnce in the internal . affairs of other states 
.•·. which should not be. diluted under. any pretext .... . 
'.< 18. We reaffirm that basic human rights and funda-
'mental freedoms are of universal validity. We weJ-
~~e the, gwwing .Jrend to\Y&rds d~mocracy pd 
conuirlt oursclye8 to cooperation in the piotcction of 
human rights. We believe that economic and social 
progreu facilitate . the · achievement -0f these objec-
.) ives. No :~lmtry.11(,wever, ~ould ~; it$ pow~ to 
db dictate itS concept of dem0cracy. and bun.wt rights or 
·••···. fo ~ C<mditionalities on ~rs. In the promotiQD 
.and the pro.tection of these. rights and.freedoms.:wc 
emphasise> the inter-reJatedn¢ss of the. various cat-
egories, call for a balanced relationship betWeen 
individual .00 coDUilllnity rights, uphold the compct-
~cc amt 'responsibility of national government& in 
their imPJementation. The _Non-Aligned countries 
therefore shall coordinate their positiOllS and actively 
participate in the pi'q>aratOry work of the SCOOnd 
)Vorld O>nference on Huma.n •R.ig1lts bt1une 1993, in 
ordCr to .• ensure· that .. the Co:rifcrencc .· addresses an 
..~  Qf:human rights on the basis of univelsality, 
;~i~. impaltiality and no~. 
as mistaken because it sees economic development as the 
only way to success. Economic development and economic 
rights can only be attained and reinforced if they are 
accompanied by civil and political rights. They are 
inseparable. 
This is why the literature uses the concept of the 
indivisibility of civil and political rights and social, 
economic and cultural rights. While recognising the concept 
of indivisibility, The Jakarta Message in fact proceeds from 
the standpoint of divisibility. This will create many 
problems for us in future .... [Tempo, 19.09.1992) 'It 
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Military grip on East Timor-tightens 
The Non -aligned Movement Summit in September was the occasion for heightened security measures 
in Dili to ensure no -one tried to take advantage of the presence of hundreds off oreign journalists to 
hold demonstrations. In August, the army launched a new offensive, hoping to capture resistance 
leader, Xanana Gusmao. 
Military offensive underway 
Brig. Gen Theo Syafei hopes to "finish off" Falintil, the 
armed resistance, and capture its leader, Xanana Gusmao, 
in time to disband the special Dili operational command, 
Kolakops, by the end of September. 
Jose Ramos-Horta, external representative of the resis-
tance council, CNRM, warned early in August that a new 
offensive had been launched, expressing the fear that this 
action might become "as violent as in 1977 and 1978 when 
90 per cent of the guerrillas were killed or captured" (AFP, 
8.08.1992]. The Fretilin representative in Darwin, Alfredo 
Pereira, later spoke of the guerrillas being locked in battle 
with Indonesian troops in the regions of Viqueque and 
Daucau. He had received reports of a fierce battle in Same 
region during which seven guerrillas and 20 Indonesian 
soldiers were killed. The battle took place in Aiburbur 
Laran, near Mount Cablaque. "The Indonesians are trying 
to encircle (the guerrillas) and push them towards the centre 
of Timor," Pereira said [Reuter, 11.08.1992]. 
Although an armed forces spokesperson denied that an 
offensive was under way, there have been several claims in 
the Indonesian press during August about guerrillas being 
captured or killed. Jakarta Post [2.09.1992] reported one 
"armed contact" in East Timor, during which two 
Indonesian soldiers were killed. It is rare for the Indonesian 
military to admit any casualties on their side, which means 
that their losses may have been far greater. 
Information from protected sources in Indonesia add to the 
picture of ongoing operations. They report that: 
*army units have been stationed everywhere in the country, 
and villagers are forced to accompany the troops on 
military operations as a shield against attacks by the guer-
Call for help from East Timor 
The following letter, which was written in Portuguese and dated "Java, 5 September 199a", ·nus.a 
req!ived by TAPOL with a tequest that we publish it: 
To the Di.rectors of international human rights i113titutions 
in A.111trillia, America, Europe and Africa: 
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rilla forces; 
* soldiers dressed as guerril1as have attacked vi11ages, in 
order to undermine the people's trust in the resistance. 
A cJaim in Jakarta Post [16.09.1992] that people digging 
graves in Manatutu were shot dead by guerril1as could we11 
be an example of the above. 
Brig.Gen. Syafei also said that his "territorial campaign" 
of swamping Timorese vil1ages with troops was stil1 in 
place. The aim he said is to "memerahputihkan (turn red-
and-white, the colour of the Indonesian flag) the vilJages, 
sub-districts and districts". He complained of "two-faced" 
people who were not yet "red-and-white", people who 
work as government employees but "whose thoughts are in 
the bush" [Jawa Pos, 30.07.1992]. 
Tight security in Timor during NAM 
During the week when the non-aligned summit was held in 
Jakarta, security control in East Tim.or was stepped up to a 
level not experienced for months. Armed troops were on 
guard at an so-caUed 'strategic' places like schools, 
churches and other buildings. Describing the tense atmos-
phere, Jawa Pos [10.09.1992] said the military was on high 
alert, fearing that groups of young Timorese would unfurl 
banners in the presence of Bishop Belo during Mass on 
Sunday 6 September. The Mass was cance11ed for 'security' 
reasons. Army controls in an out of Dili were intensified. 
After the 'NAM alert' had been scaled down, the paper 
reported that uniformed officers on the streets were replaced 
by plain clothes inte11igence agents roaming the streets. 
Reports that had been reaching TAPOL of many arrests 
were confirmed by Brig.Gen. Theo Syafei who announced 
that eight civil servants had been arrested in Viqueque 
'recently'. On another occasion 25 people had been arrested 
in Maliana. They were all being subjected to indoctrination 
[di-P4-kan]. Refusing to explain where they were being 
held, an exasperated Syafei said 120 hours of indoctrination 
would not be enough. "Even three thousand hours won't be 
enough. Just imagine, 18 years has not been enough!" 
[Jawa Pos, 15-09-1992] 
A sma11 group of East Timorese who wanted to fly from 
Dili to Jakarta while the Summit was in progress were 
prevented from doing so. According to one report, they 
were caught at the airport, found to be carrying foreign-
language posters and banners and held for questioning. 
Earlier, a group of seven or eight young East Timorese 
fled to Jakarta from Dili. They were probably intending to 
take part in an action in the Indonesian capita] during the 
Summit. In the event, nothing happened and the escapees 
went into hiding. They have sent a plea for help to a 
number of international human rights organisations, includ-
ing TAPOL. The text of their Jetter is reproduced below. 
Details have also emerged of the arrest of 20 school-
pupils, 15 from SMA Negeri-I (state secondary school), 4 
from SMA Santo Paulus and 1 from the Sacred Heart SMA, 
aH apparently in Dili. 
A young man, Antonio Baptista Sequeira, who had been 
transferred from Dili to Viqueque and placed under the 
control of the local military commander, managed to escape 
and return to his family in Dili. However, he was re-
arrested in August. Antonio was among the more than three 
dozen Timorese arrested immediately after the Santa Cruz 
massacre on 12 November 1991. Later, 13 of the detainees 
were tried; the other 24 were sent to local military com-
mands "for indoctrination and special treatment", according 
to Brig. Gen. Theo Syafei [Suara Karya, 9.03.92, see 
TAPOL Bulletin, April 1992, p. 7]. We now know that these 
fEAST TIMOR 
youngsters have been used as TBOs or "bearers" for the 
troops while on combat duty. Antonio said, before his re-
arrest: "I couldn't bear all the noise of the battles raging. I 
couldn't bear having to help the Indonesian troops who I 
hate so much." 
A recent visitor to East Timor said he had been told of 
many arrests in Viqueque in July. In the middle of that 
month, seven men were held, beaten "till black in the face" 
and later released after intervention by the International Red 
Cross. Later, 50 youths were arrested. The names of some 
of those arrested have since reached us, but we cannot 
confirm whether they are stiJJ being held. 
Another victim of this latest wave of arrests is Talofo 
Moniz Alin, arrested in Dili on 1 August. TaJofo was 
arrested and badly beaten in December 1990, along with 
many others . . 
Talofo Moniz Alin, after his arrest in 1991. He is high on the 
blacklist of the intelligence. 
The fo11owing are some fragments of information from 
protected sources: 
* on 6 July, the home of the Same parish priest was 
surrounded by troops who were chasing a young man 
wanted because he attended the demonstration in Dili on 12 
November; 
* two women, Justina of Gariwai and Deolinda from 
Makalaku, were arrested, taken to Dili and tortured to get 
them to divulge the names of resistance fighters; 
* on 21 July, two men sought refuge at the Bishop's House 
DiJi, were foUowed into the grounds by soldiers; ' 
* many local priests are under surveillance and are being 
accused of helping the resistance. • 
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Visits and non-visits 
Four Portuguese journalists who were allowed into Indo-
nesia to cover the Summit were initially told that no limits 
would be placed on their visit and given permission to go 
to East Timor. However, at the last moment, the trip was 
cancelled on the orders of the military commander. As far 
as is known, none of the other foreign journalists in Jakarta 
for the Summit was a1Iowed to visit East Timor. 
Two contacts who visited East Timor independently in 
July and August as tourists described the huge difficulty of 
speaking to anyone, in the knowledge that anyone seen 
speaking to foreigners, for whatever reason, would later be 
hauled in for interrogation. Both reported that on arrival at 
Dili airport, all foreign visitors are photographed as they get 
off the plane. One wrote: "As each westerner descended the 
steps, our friend the photographer snapped his/her picture. 
I learned from other westerners that the same person greets 
every ferry that arrives in Dili from Kupang or other 
islands." 
This contact spoke of not knowing who you could trust: 
"One night, someone stood outside my hotel for a couple of 
hours, peering through a little hole in the window as I Jay 
in bed. It was pretty scary as I had no idea what to do." 
In one district capital he was "invited" to the military 
commander's home "for a chat" which lasted one-and-a-
half hours. "Why had I come to East Timor? What did I 
know about the Santa Cruz event? How did the 'reality' of 
East Timor compare with the picture presented outside?" 
One thing that had impressed him was the scale of the 
Indonesian presence. While he could not confirm that there 
are 100,000 Indonesians in East Timor, "at the very least, 
they number in the midhigh tens of thousands. I was 
constantly meeting Indonesians who had recently arrived ... 
As many Timorese said to me, 'All of Indonesia is here'." 
The other visitor, who was in East Timor with a col-
league, said that on returning from a day trip to Ermera, 
"we were virtuaJJy interrogated as to whether we'd spoken 
to anyone and what our professions were. During a visit to 
Quelicai, we were accompanied almost the whole time by 
a plain clothes officer". Although they had found it difficult 
to enter into conversation with East Timorese, on one occa-
sion, at a bus-stop in Baucau, a Timorese student told them 
he had been at the Santa Cruz memorial meeting, had lost 
many friends in the massacre, and said security officers 
were continuing to arrest and even kill members of the 
opposition. The conversation was soon interrupted by 
someone who invited the tourists for tea! 
Despite aJJ this, both contacts said that the few Timorese 
they met had stressed the importance of tourists' visits. ~ 
Jakarta forced to the negotiating table 
All parties dfrectly concemed 
Since 1982, the last time a resolution was adopted' on Bast 
Timor at the General Assembly, talks between Po!tupl anCl 
Indonesia have never incJuded East Timorese repreaenta-
tncs. This time- the Portupcse have ilisistCd on inclUdlng 
the Timorcse, m line wi Genetal Assembly RtSOlution 
37/30 of 1982 which called on 1hc Secretary-General to 
boJd consultations with •a11 parties directly eonceftled• in 
the conflict. 
guese proposal was fJatly rejected IBdoftesia. 
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New Santa Cruz casualty figure: 273 died 
A new report released in Lisbon points to a much higher death toll at the Santa Cruz massacre l~st 
November than previously estimated. After several months of investigation in East Timor by a wide 
range of people, the information smuggled out of East Timor gives a heavily increased figure for those 
killed, disappeared and wounded. Analysis of the lists sets the number of dead at 273, tho_se 
disappeared at 255 and wounded at 376. Peace is Possible in East Timor, the Portuguese group which 
studied the lists, explains how the figures wer.e reached. 
The release of the figures coincided with the airing in 
Lisbon of a home-made video in which five East Timorese 
survivors and witnesses of the massacre daim that more 
than 200 people were killed and that they saw more than 
100 corpses being dumped in the sea. The new report 
supports this and concludes that the figures are still higher. 
Just how were these horrendous figures calculated? 
The information was gathered spontaneously over three 
months by East Timorese people, mostly following standard 
forms produced by the National Council of the Maubere 
Resistance (CNRM). The CNRM form seeks as much 
information as possible on the victim: name and surname, 
age, case (dead, disappeared or wounded), family details 
and in each case there is a space for the signature or mark 
of the person who gave the information. While other less 
complete forms are induded, most mention the victim's 
profession and some even the victim's birthplace. 
The lists are in themselves testimony to the bravery and 
determination of the East Timorese people. They were 
collected in a time of severe repression by the Indonesian 
military and East Timorese found in possession of such lists 
were imprisoned. The suppression of information by 
Indonesia led to families and friends of victims being too 
frightened to speak of their missing or dead ehildren 
because of possible repercussions. Despite the threats, many 
spoke out. 
After the first lists were sent to the leader of the resis-
tance, he drew up some rules on the collection of informa-
tion, largely to prevent duplication and reliance on rumour. 
In the end, there were 3,500 names on the lists which were 
tentatively analysed in East Timor. 
Peace is Possible in East Timor entered all the lists in a 
computer and subjected them to a specially designed 
analysis programme. The principle guidelines were: to 
suppress repetition (unless particularly dear that the same 
name refers to different people; for example where differ-
ence in age is more than 10 years or where profession or 
parentage is said to be different); and where only one name 
identifies the victim, it is considered to be the same as 
another case of the same name. After being passed through 
the programme, the lists were reduced to around 1,300 
names. 
The next problem was that for the same or supposedly the 
same victim, the case (death, disappearance or wounding) 
was different. Here, the starting point was the list of names 
who were said by sources to have been killed. If a name is 
also said to be disappeared, the name remained in both 
categories. Where a source says the named victim was 
wounded, this category is kept and the name removed from 
disappeared or killed lists. Where there is an indication that 
the victim has been arrested, this category is used rather 
Santa Cruz, 12 November 1991. Soon after this photo was taken, 
the shooting started. Almost half of those killed were under 30 
years of age and many were under 21. "This is deliberate killing 
of the young people. My God, I am horrified at these .findings. 
I know them to be completely accurate", commented Jose 
Ramos-Horta, CNRM spokesperson. Photo: Svend Kochs 
than any other mentioned. In other words, the least bad 
atrocity was used in the final count. 
Clearly, the formulae used are strict, yet even though the 
figures may be an underestimate, they surpass all our worst 
estimations. As Peace is Possible point out, "The figures are 
far higher than those furnished previously. Perhaps there 
was a certain body of analysts who did not want to increase 
the figures. To the 150-180 killed on 12 November 1991, 
the victims of the collective massacres on the following 
days have not been added, even though they had been 
revealed by credible sources". As for the discrepancy on the 
number of disappearances as compared with earlier esti-
mates, it is dear that people continued to disappear for 
many weeks with the date sometimes given on the sworn 
lists. The huge disparity in the figures for the wounded is 
because the official (Indonesian) figures of 91 only referred 
to those victims in the Dili military hospital. * 
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UN Sub-Commission condemns killings in East Timor 
The UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, at its 44th 
Session in Geneva, adopted a strongly-worded resolution on the Situation in East Timor, by 13 votes 
to 6, with four abstentions, on 27August1992. Although the Sub-Commission has adopted six previous 
resolutions on East Timor, for the first time, this year's resolution was adopted by an absolute majority. 
The Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities, 
Bearing in mind the provisions of the Charter of the 
United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, 
Recalling resolution 37/30 of 23 November 1982 of the 
General Assembly in which it requested the Secretary-
Gencral to initiate consultations with all parties directly 
concerned to resolve the conflict in East Timor, 
Recalling its resolutions 1982/20 of 8 September 1982, 
1983/26 of 6 September 1983, 1984/24 of 29 August 1984, 
1987/13 of 2 September 1987, 198917 of 31 August 1989 
and 1990/15 of 30 August 1990 concerning the situation in 
East Timor, 
Bearing in mind the consensus statements by the Chair-
man of its forty-third session (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/SR.26) 
and the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, 
adopted on 4 March 1992, at its forty-eighth session 
(E/CN .4/1992/SR.54/ Add .1 ), 
Having examined the report of the visit to East Timor by 
its Special Rapporteur on the question of torture, Mr Peter 
Kooijmans (E/CN.4/1992/17/Add. l), 
Appalled at the loss of life and injuries among civilians 
resulting from the violent incidents of 12 November 1991, 
and concerned at the fate of those who are missing, 
Welcoming the decision of the Secretary-General to send 
Mr Amos Wako as his Personal Envoy to inquire into the 
violent incidents of 12 November 1991, 
Regretting that the conclusions of the National Commis-
sion of Inquiry set up by the Indonesian Government failed, 
in its conclusions, to identify clearly those responsible for 
the killings, 
Considering that the Government of Indonesia had 
undertaken to adopt the measures necessary towards the 
implementation of the recommendations of the Special 
Rapporteur on the question of torture, 
Disturbed by the heavy sentences passed on the East 
Timorese involved in political activities on the basis of the 
"Anti-Subversion Law" whose abrogation had been recom-
mended by the Special Rapporteur on the question of 
torture of the Commission on Human Rights, 
Disturbed also by reports of continuing human rights 
violations in East Timor, 
Disappointed by the persistent denial of access to the 
territory to human rights organisations, 
1. Deplores the tragic events in Dili on 12 November 
1991, in which East Timorese civilians, including women 
and children, were killed; 
2. Expresses its utmost concern at reports of continuing 
widespread human rights violations in East Timor; 
3. Invites the Secretary-General to transmit the fuJJ report 
of his Personal Envoy, Mr Amos Wako, to the Commission 
on Human Rights at its forty-ninth session; 
4. Requests the Secretary-General in the preparation of his 
report on the situation in East Timor for consideration by 
the Commission on Human Rights under item 12 to include 
an analytical compilation of aJJ information received from, 
inter alia, Governments, intergovernmental and non-
governmental organisations, 
5. Commends the decision of the Government of Indo-
nesia to set up a National Commission of Inquiry, but 
regrets that investigation of the actions of the armed forces 
on 12 November 1991 has not been foJJowed through and 
invites the Indonesian authorities to cooperate in the 
preparation of the above-mentioned report of the Secre-
tary-General by providing information on the complemen-
tary measures to bring the members of the armed forces 
responsible to justice, 
6. Urges the Government of Indonesia to provide the 
Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances 
information regarding the missing persons; 
7. Also urges the Indonesian authorities on humanitarian 
grounds to cooperate with the families of the victims by 
providing information about the dead and the whereabouts 
of their remains for proper burial; 
8. Calls upon the Indonesian authorities to honour their 
commitment to facilitate access to East Timor by humani-
tarian and human rights organisations; 
9. Decides to review the situation in East Timor at its 
forty-fifth session and to this end asks the Secretariat to 
transmit to it aU available information concerning the 
human rights situation in the territory. 
East Timor, the major issue 
A number of non-governmental organisations made 
submissions and several expert-members of the Sub-
Commission spoke about East Timor, referring in particular 
to the Santa Cruz Massacre last November. Of aU the many 
tragic problems on the Sub-Commission's agenda this year, 
East Timor attracted the greatest attention. ~ 
\, 
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Osorio Soares, the new governor 
Abilio Osorio Soares, 45, has been appointed the governor 
of East Timor. Although strongly denied by the authorities 
in Jakarta, Osorio's 'election' as governor has been the result 
of complicated manoeuvres by a triangle (President Suharto, 
Home Affairs Minister ret'd General Rudini and ABRI, the 
armed forces). ABRI had to withdraw their own candidate, 
the Javanese general, A.B.Saridjo, at present the vice.: 
governor. The situation in East Tim or was considered to be 
too volatile to have a non-Timorese as governor. 
ABRI, in particular the Indonesian military in East Timor, 
then promoted Abilio Osorio. Soares which became the only 
real candidate for Jakarta. 
Background 
Osorio, described as 'Integration Hero' by the Indonesian 
press, was a founder of the pro-Indonesian APODET/ party. 
Ex-Governor Mario Ca"ascalao (left) with his successor, Abilio 
Osorio Soares. The new man enjoys wearing uniforms. 
In Portuguese days, Abilio completed junior high school 
and joined Tropaz, the Portuguese colonial army. After the 
Indonesian invasion, his career raced ahead. He has held 
many important posts in Indonesia's '27th province' - head 
of public works, mayor ofDili in the late eighties and most 
recently, district chief of Manatuto, where he was born. 
Close to ABRI 
Abilio Osorio is close to the Indonesian military. Following 
the Indonesian invasion, he became an key informer. He is 
particularly close to Colonel Prabowo, Suharto's son-in-
law, who has served long stints in East Timor. Abilio brags 
about his friendship with Prabowo which dates back to 
1976 when Prabowo was just a lieutenant. 
His relationship with his predecessor Mario Carrascalao is 
much less cosy. The conflict between them reflects the 
fierce rivalry between UDT and Apodeti. The two first 
governors were from Apodeti, which resulted in large 
numbers of civil servants being recruited from their ranks. 
When Carrascalao, a founder of UDT, took over, many 
former UDT members were brought into the administration. 
During Abilio Osorio's period as mayor of Dili, the ninja 
(para-military gangs dressed in black) started operating, 
terrorising the inhabitants of Dili. This was the source of 
ensuing conflicts with Carrascalao and probably explains 
why Osorio was moved to Manatuto, far from Dili. 
While both collaborate fully with Jakarta, Carrascalao 
tried to promote a Timorese identity and sought, largely in 
vain, to win a greater say for the regional administration. 
Abilio Osorio is determined to mould Timorese into good 
Indonesians and accuses Carrascalao of concentrating on the 
physical aspects of Pembangunan (development), ignoring 
the political side. Mario Carrascalao tried, within narrow 
margins, to shed the image of a puppet. It is expected that 
Osorio Soares will let himself be used as a puppet by both 
ABRI and the Indonesian administration. ~ 
General Sintong sued in US Federal court 
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ICJ issues report on Timor trials 
For the first time since 1966, when the first political trials were held under the Suharto regime, a team 
off oreign observers has produced a report on the conduct of subversion trials in Indonesia. 
The International Commission of Jurists published its 
report1 in August, when the UN Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities 
was in session. The Australian lawyer, Rodney Lewis, a 
solicitor of the New South Wales Supreme Court, attended 
the early stages of the trial of Gregorio da Cunha Saldanha 
in Dili, while another lawyer attended hearings of the five 
East Timorese who were tried in Jakarta. However, Justice 
Xavier Connor, a former Judge of the Federal Court of 
Australia, was denied permission to go to Dili to attend the 
concluding stages of the Dili trials on the grounds that the 
trials would have ended by the time his visa came through. 
There have been numerous attempts in the past to con-
vince lawyers' organisations to observe political trials in 
Indonesia. The ICJ, which last February published its 
investigation into the Santa Cruz Massacre2, is to be 
congratulated for overcoming the obstacles and producing 
an independent record of the way the regime uses the courts 
to persecute its opponents. However, its report is lacking in 
several respects. 
The introductory history of the East Timor question fails 
to highlight the reign of terror inflicted on the East Timo-
rese since 1975 and dwells on less important events. In 
places it is simply wrong, claiming for instance that mem-
bers of the so-called Representative Council which adopted 
a petition in May 1976 calling for integration with Indo-
nesia were elected "in traditional manner based on a form 
of consensus". No election of any kind took place, as many 
Timorese have testified. 
The report deals most thoroughly with the trials of five 
East Timorese charged with involvement in the 19 Novem-
ber 1991 demonstration in Jakarta, summarising the indict-
ments, the examination of witnesses, the defence statements 
and the verdicts. No defence witnesses were called in any 
of the trials so the defence lawyers were only able to 
present their cases by cross-examining prosecution 
witnesses. The defence wanted to call representatives from 
the UN, Japanese and Australian missions where the 19 
November 1991 demonstrators took their petition of protest, 
but they refused to appear. 
The report is particularly critical of the absence of the 
defendant's right to remain silent, which has its roots in the 
Criminal Procedural Code (KUHAP). "Not only were the 
defendants required to testify in the proceedings against 
each other, they were compelled to testify in their own 
trials as well" (p.48). It also criticised the inclusion of 
testimonies from prosecution witnesses who did not attend 
in person. "The introduction into evidence of the statements 
of witnesses who were unable to attend the trials, as is 
permitted by KUHAP, further deprived the defendants of 
the critical right to confront or cross examine their 
accusers" (p.48). 
What is Jacking is an evaluation of the defendants' 
argument that they are Portuguese citizens and should not 
be tried under Indonesian law. This is hardly mentioned in 
the report yet it was crucial to the defendants' strategy. It 
would have been very helpful if the ICJ had commented on 
the validity of the defendants' claim. 
The section about the Dili trials is confined to 
summarising the trial of Gregorio da Cunha Saldanha and 
even here, the coverage is inadequate. It says nothing about 
attempts during the trial to prove that demonstrators were 
carrying weapons. There is no mention of the court session 
was held at a weapons depot, with weapons on display 
which had allegedly been confiscated from demonstrators. 
When Gregorio asked the court to view TV footage of the 
marchers, to see whether anyone was carrying arms, the 
request was ignored by the court. 
The ICJ account focuses on the fact that army intelligence 
UN Decolonisation Committee 
A record number of petitioners - 23 in all - attended this 
year's UN Special Committee on Decolonisation to 
condemn the Indonesian occupation of East Timor. The 
commission heard eyewitness accounts, testimonies from 
East Timor support groups and petitions from East 
Timorese representatives. Xanana Gusmao, head of the 
resistance, sent a message to the UN which was delivered 
by Jose Ramos-Horta, spokesperson of CNRM. 
This year, far more petitions than usual came from the 
US, reflecting the rapid growth of East Timor solidarity 
groups linked to the US East Timor Action Network which 
was set up following the Santa Cruz massacre. {C 
EASTTIMOR 
STATIMENT 
TO THE lJN Dl!COl.ONISATION OOMMJnD 
NEW YORK, JULY Dn 
occasional reports no. 19 
Occasional Reports no.19 contains TAPOL's submission to 
the 1992 meeting of the UN Decolonisation Committee. 
Price £ 1.00 including postage 
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infiltrated the marchers. This is undoubtedly true. But 
attention is directed in particular to the "missing defendant", 
Constantio Pinto, acknowledged by all to have played a key 
role in planning the attempt by Timorese to approach the 
Portuguese MPs whose visit to East Timor was aborted at 
the last minute, and in preparing the 12 November march. 
"He was not charged with any offence. On the basis of the 
evidence and the charges brought against the defendants, it 
is startling to discover that he has not been charged at alJ 
and is said to be in hiding." Why is this "startling"? The 
most obvious explanation is that the security forces have 
failed to capture him and he is indeed in hiding. Isn't it 
likely that, frustrated at not catching Pinto, the army tried 
Gregorio as a kind of proxy for Pinto, compounding the 
issue by telling Gregorio that Pinto "is one of us"? 
When the ICJ Report was published in Geneva, the 
Australian observer issued his own report in Sydney, along 
with a press release alleging that Pinto was an lndonesian 
"spy" and that there was "credible evidence" that army 
intelligence "perhaps even directed the demonstration 
through their agent Pinto". These allegations do not appear 
in the Geneva report but they colour the analysis which 
throws doubt on Pinto's reliability. Later, Rodney Lewis 
retracted his "spy" allegations, saying he had been the 
victim of a campaign of disinformation. 
Soldiers should be charged for homicide 
The trials of ten soldiers and policemen, held with hardly 
any fore-warning, were not observed by any outsiders. The 
ICJ correctly observes that on the basis of what the Nation-
al Commission of Inquiry (KPN) said about "excessive 
EA.STTIMOR 
shooting" and "unidentified" troops firing "shots and com-
mitting beatings, causing more casualties", it appears 
conclusive that "both homicide and serious assault have 
taken place on the part of security forces. The charges 
involving disobeying orders are, therefore, patently absurd" 
(p.62). It recommended that charges of homicide be brought 
"against all ABRI personnel involved in the 'excessive 
shooting' .. . together with those directly or indirectly 
responsible for those actions". Oddly, it also recommends 
that charges of subversion be laid "against aJJ ABRI 
personnel implicated in the planning, preparation and 
carrying out of the demonstrations in both Dili and Jakarta". 
Do the compilers of the report seriously believe that the 
army organised the demonstrations? This is preposterous. 
To argue that army intelligence knew the demonstrations 
would occur, allowed them to happen and infiltrated agents 
to stir up emotions, thereby providing the pretext for the 
troops to shoot, is vastly different from suggesting that the 
army actually organised the demonstration. Perhaps what is 
lacking is any understanding on the part of the lCJ of the 
tradition of army infiltration into genuine mass action 
(Tanjung Priok in 1984, Lampung in 1989). 
Nor is it helpful to recommend that President Suharto 
should set up a new commission to conduct a full inquiry 
into the massacre. Why should anyone believe that another 
Suharto inquiry will be reliable when the first two have 
taken us nowhere near understanding what happened? Only 
an independent inquiry . can help. J} 
1. Tragedy in East Timor: Report on the Trials in Dili and Jakarta. 
2. Blaming the Victims: The 12 November 1991 Massacre in Dili, East Timor and the Response of the Indonesian 
Government. 
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law, which provides for extremely high fines for traffic 
violations, was to have come into force on 17 September. 
ln August, many sections of society - students, truck-
drivers and bus-drivers - planned mass protests to start on 
1 September. Although government ministers had repeatedly 
insisted that the law could not be amended, President 
Suharto suddenly stepped in to defuse the row, announcing 
that the Jaw would be postponed until September 1993. 
11 External threats 11 
Ahead of the Summit, General Kentot gave a briefing to aJJ 
university deans, campuses being seen as places of potential 
unrest. He elaborated on 'external' and 'domestic' threats. 
Heading the list of people regarded as 'external threats' were 
two staff members of TAPOL: Carmel Budiardjo and Liem 
Soei Liong. {{ 
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Acehnese refugees held in a Malaysian dungeon 
Eleven Acehnese men, all political refagees who fled from Aceh early last year seeking asylum in 
Malaysia, have been incarcerated in an underground prison on Penang Island for the last 14 months. 
The eleven, seen as diehards by the Malaysian government, were separated from other detained 
Acehnese who are under heavy pressure to return home 'voluntarily'. 
The Malaysian government have fina11y acknowledged the 
existence of the 43 Acehnese political asylum seekers who 
have been camping at the UNHCR office since 22 June [see 
Tapol Bulletin, No 112, August 1992]. A baby born in the 
office brings the total to 44. But Deputy Prime Minister 
Ghafar Baba vehemently denies that there are some 2,000 
Acehnese refugees in Malaysia. He also denies that several 
hundred remain in various Malaysian jails and that 300 
others have been illegaJJy 'refouled to Indonesia. All he has 
done is to demand that someone come forward with names 
[Berita Harian, 5 Sept. 1992]. 
On that same day, ASNLF (the Aceh/Sumatra National 
Liberation Front) obliged Mr Baba with a detailed report 
and lists of the names of Acehnese prisoners. Besides the 
11 in the dungeon, the list includes 80 names of people 
detained in the UKK-Juru Bukit Mertajam jail in Penang, 
29 in Perak State Prison in Taiping, 2 women in the city 
jail of Penang, 34 in Kedah State Prison, Alor Star and 6 
young Acehnese detained in Sungai Patani Prison in Kedah. 
The report supplies many details about the conditions of the 
prisoners, most of whom have been detained for more than 
14 months. 
The conditions in the prisons are harsh; no visits are 
allowed even by relatives legally resident in Malaysia. Only 
officials from the Indonesian consulate have free and 
unlimited access to the prisons. The diet in the Bukit 
Mertajam jail is described as inadequate and illnesses have 
struck prisoners because of malnutrition. The conditions in 
the other prisons are even worse: medical treatment is 
denied, resulting in untreated illnesses. In the Sungai Patani 
Prison, the 6 young Acehnese have been forced to mix with 
sentenced criminals and although they have not been 
convicted or even charged with any offence, they are forced 
to wear prison clothes. · 
The 11 in the dungeon 
The news about the 11 held in a dungeon came to light 
through a letter smuggled out by a victim. "For one year 
and two months we have not seen the sun, the sky or the 
earth.... PhysicaJly we are dissolving, our skins desiccating, 
our teeth are constantly bleeding, our health deteriorating 
and we have never been given a medical check-up since 
we arrived in Malaysia" said the letter. 
The men are: Syahbuddin Hasan, Yusof Idris, .Ridwan 
Abu Bakar, Hamdani Abdul Gani, M. Kasem Amin, M. Nur 
Abdullah, M. Daud Abu Bakar, A. Jalil Yusuf, Shahabuddin 
Abu Bakar, Sulaiman Ilham A. Gani and Djamaluddin 
Usman. TAPOL, gravely concerned at the men's physical 
condition has asked the UK Government, through its office 
in Kuala Lumpur, to seek information about the precise 
whereabouts of the men who, by rights, ought not to be in 
detention at a11. The UK Government was asked to press for 
the men to be medically examined, treated immediately for 
their deteriorating physical condition and moved without 
delay from their present place of detention. Lord Avebury, 
chair of the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group 
addressed the Foreign Office and the UNHCR in similar 
terms. 
The 43 (and a baby) in the UNHCR Office 
At the time of writing, the situation of the 44 remains 
deadlocked. The Malaysian authorities still refuse to 
recognise the 44 as political asylum seekers. The UNHCR, 
under heavy pressure from Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur, has 
refused to issue identity cards to the 44 but want them to 
leave the UNHCR premises. Considering the atrocious 
conditions of Acehnese detained in Malaysian prisons, it is 
more than understandable that the 44 to refuse to leave 
without proper guarantees. The UNHCR officials complain 
about being overwhelmed by the problems of refugees from 
former Yugoslavia, Cambodia and Afghanistan but the 
Acehnese will not accept this as an excuse for inactivity. 
The 44, including a newborn /Jaby, have set up camp in tl1e 
UNHCR premises, now in the fourth month of their stay. 
The case of the 44 has won widespread support. Amnesty 
International produced an Urgent Action. Hotline based in 
Hongkong circulated a worldwide campaign and the 
Geneva-based SOS-Torture launched a letter-writing 
campaign pleading for the 44 not to be forced back to 
Indonesia. 
Tengku Hasan in Geneva 
For the second year running, Tengku Hasan di Tiro, leader 
of the ASNLF, addressed the UN Sub-Commission on 
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Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. 
This time his topic was the case of the Acehnese refugees 
in Malaysia. Comparing the case of Bosnia with Aceh, he 
strongly criticised the Malaysian Government for helping 
Indonesia "to eliminate and destroy the last remaining eye-
witnesses and direct evidences to the prosecution by 
deporting these refugees to the killing fields, so that 
Indonesia can finish them off". 
ACEH 
Tengku Hasan di Tiro requested the Sub-commission to 
stop Malaysia continuing along a "wicked and dangerous 
path". Both Indonesia and Malaysia used their right to reply 
to answer the allegations but the plight of the 44 refugees 
remains. * 
Acehnese victims named 
The Aceh-Sumatra National Liberation Front (ASNLF) has 
published the names of 23 victims of extrajudicial killings 
in Aceh in the last eighteen months. The list, given in a 
Press Release issued by Tengku Hasan di Tiro, president of 
the ASNLF, on 21September1992, also includes the names 
of many Acehnese who have disappeared after being taken 
into custody. 
In many cases, details of the date and place of arrest and 
the way in which the victims were killed are given. The 
majority of victims are 40 years or more and several 
women are also named. The following is a small Selection 
of the cases: 
Nurdin Usman Murni, 24, of Blang Kumot village, 
district of Lemmeulo, Pidie, was shot dead on 10 December 
1991 in Panlon Lualh village by para-commandos. He was 
decapitated and for two weeks, the military prevented the 
family from burying the victim, whose brother, Jailani U 
Murni, 18, was murdered in similar circumstances a year 
earlier. 
Sulaiman Tjot Murong, 25, of Lemeulo, Pidie was shot 
dead by troops on 14 March 1992 at 6.30am. His body was 
later returned to his family by soldiers who said his killing 
"had been a mistake". 
Teungku Imum Ramah, 80, a highly respected man in 
the community, was shot dead on 3 April 1992 at lOam as 
he was walking in the street. 
lljas Ali, 40, and Utolh Yusuf, 50, were shot dead 
together on 10 June 1992 in Amut village, Pidie. 
Rusli Atjeh, 65, of Keude Geureubak, ldi Rajek district, 
was arrested without warrant, tortured and shot dead on 
January 24 1991. 
Mrs Bang Lah Meuleuweuek, 35, was arrested in her 
home on 30 June 1991 by troops who had come looking for 
her husband. The next day, her body was found in the street 
with bullet-wounds on her forehead and chest. She had also 
been burnt with lighted cigarettes. 
Among the many disappearances listed are two brothers, 
Hasjlden Rusen, 28, and Jusuf Rusen, 20, who were 
arrested at their home on 4 December 1991. They were 
accused of participating in a flag-raising ceremony on 4 
December 1991, to commemorate the ASNLF proclamation 
of independence in 1976. 
Another person who has disappeared is Sjeh Abbas, about 
50, who 'voluntarily' returned from Malaysia where he had 
fled seeking political asylum. He was arrested on 5 June 
1992 and has since disappeared. 
Another returnee from Malaysia named in the list is 
Abdurrachman, 37, from Alue Lhok, Peureulak, who, 
together with three others (whose names are not known), 
was brought back from Malaysia four days before the 
Indonesian general election in June. The four men were 
arrested, interrogated and tortured so severely that they 
went ·out of their minds. They were released on 12 June, 
demoralised and physically broken. 
Mrs Mariani Jusuf Ali, 25, from Simpang Ulim was 
arrested shortly after the murder of her husband, Jusuf Ali, 
by troops on 28 December 1991. After being detained for 
several months at the notorious Rangkom prison where she 
was tortured, she was transferred to a prison in Jakarta. 
The ASNLF also reports that hundreds of people were 
rounded up after 25 June 1992, in the regions of Pidie and 
Batee Illek. Their present whereabouts are not known. lt 
also says that, since June this year, in Pidie Peureulak and 
Pase the corpses of unidentified persons have again been 
found in the countryside, on a similar scale to the 
happenings in 1989 when Indonesian troops first launched 
their campaign to crush Acehnese resistance. 
On 17 April this year, armed units entered ljot Kmet 
village, Pase, to arrest two men, suspected as members of 
the ASNLF. Unable to find them, they accused the villagers 
of concealing the men and forced them to lie down and 
stare at the sun. Other brutalities included being forced to 
crawl on rough terrain, being kicked by the soldiers, and 
being forced to enter a pool of muddy water. 1f 
Protest at the UN 
Suharto's speech at the UN General Assembly was billed as 
the peak of his long career as a statesman. Speaking also as 
chairman of the non-aligned movement, it was intended to 
present him one of world's political heavyweights. 
As it turns out, the speech was a non-event, a mere 
repetition of the 'Jakarta Message' [see separate item]. The 
press hardly bothered to summarise the speech, highlighting 
the fact that he did not once mention East Timor. 
But, sitting in the public gallery was Li-lien Gibbons, 
who unfurled a banner as he spoke and shouted: "Free East 
Timor". Others protested outside the UN building. 
Li-lien Gibbons is the sister of Kamal Bamadhaj who was 
killed by the Indonesian military during the massacre at 
Santa Cruz on 12 November. She has become an active 
member of the Canadian East Timar Alert Network. Her 
defiant and very public protest was widely reported in the 
press and several radio stations interviewed her. 
The day after Suharto's speech, a hard-hitting editorial 
appeared in the New York Times, lambasting Suharto's 
hypocrisy of advocating a free Palestine while subjugating 
the Timorese. "He castigated 'policies of hegemony and 
domination' ... but there was nary a peep about East Timor, 
or what his officials term 'the Nov. 12 incident'.... with 
respect to East Timor Jakarta behaves more like a banana 
republic." 
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DDISPUTES 
Siberut: Continuing destruction 
Hopes raised by President Suharto s decision about Siberut in March this year have been disappointed 
by a new unpublished report on the threatened island in West Sumatra. Among the catalogue of 
continuing destruction, the recent field report reveals that logging activity has intensified and yet more 
local people are under threat of dispossession and increased poverty. The stepping up of police and 
military activity since the March decision add a sinister note. SOS Siberut reports: 
Loggers ignore Suharto 
Despite the Presidential Decree earlier this year (see TAPOL 
Bulletin 111, June 1992) which declared that Siberut's 
future would be safeguarded, a visit to the island in May 
shows that this is far from the truth. The visit cut short 
after persistent intimidation from the island's police as well 
as harassment of local people visited, reveals that "logging 
in South Siberut is progressing quickly and now poses a 
serious threat to the ability of the people to continue to live 
according to their traditional culture". The intensive Jogging 
activities continue to cause widespread pollution of local 
water supplies, which is "undrinkable after rain". 
This all comes in the wake of President Suharto's 
declaration that three logging concessions on the island 
were to be cancelled and the protected area of the island 
extended to 190,000 hectares (March 1992). Yet in May 
"new Meranti [valuable indigenous hardwood] trees have 
been marked ready for logging". Logging roads dissect the 
unique rainforest and near one village "the road has 
dammed the ... river" so that after heavy rain "the river 
floods on one side of the road, killing the banana trees 
which grow there." Logging operations continue round the 
clock and "at night, the lights of the trucks and tractors can 
be seen." Such intensive logging has not been known before 
on Siberut. 
KLH "hopes" 
In a Jetter to the World Rainforest Movement in August, the 
Assistant Minister for Population and Environment (KLH), 
Aca Sugandhy, states that "the Forestry Department is 
currently evaluating the Jogging concession in (sic) the 
island and we hope that in 1993 the logging permits can be 
stopped". 
Whatever the KLH hopes, the .Forestry Department appear 
to be letting the loggers exploit freely for as Jong as 
possible and, by 1993, there may not be any need to cancel 
the concessions as the forest will already have been 
exhausted. It is clear that the words of the President have 
had little effect on the ground: indeed the oppressive 
treatment of the people and the destruction of the forest by 
logging companies has escalated. 
The only effect of the Presidential Decision has been to 
reiterate the area supposedly protected since 1981 when the 
whole of Siberut Island was declared a "Man and the 
Biosphere Reserve" under the UNESCO scheme. UNESCO 
have since reneged on their commitment and, inspite of 
their declaration 11 years ago, have now claimed that only 
part of the island was made a UNESCO reserve. 
Oil palm cancelled but transmigration remains 
Meanwhile, the stubborn silence over oil palm plantations 
and transmigration has been broken. In his letter, Aca 
Sugandhy finally admitted that the plans for establishing 
extensive oil palm plantations had existed but that they 
have now been cance11ed. The Indonesian government has 
also admitted that transmigration plans exist: they have 
merely been delayed until 1994. 
ADB activity 
The Asian Development Bank team have recently 
completed their preliminary assessment of the situation on 
Siberut as part of the $50 million "People and 
Conservation" project with the Indonesian government. 
The report is bleak, noting the rapid destruction of the 
environment and the negative effects of oil palm, 
transmigation, resettlement and logging. Indeed their report 
may have had an effect in the cancellation of the oil palm 
proposals. However, the AD B's chequered history forewarns 
us of the dangers and the need to push for consultation, 
cooperation and involvement of the local people. 'I--
;- Yamdena: another ·threatened island 
The 83,000 inhabitants of Yamdena, an island of 
320,000ha in the Tanimbars of south Maluku, are 
fighting to prevent the destruction of their unique 
island in the name of development. The government 
has granted Jogging company PT Alam Nusa Segar 
the conc~ion to exploit 164,000 of the 172,000 
hectares of semi-tropical forests, as well as 30,000ha 
of land for estate plantations. These concessions a1J 
overlap with the decreed nature reserve on the island. 
Y amdena islanders oppose the logging because they 
believe it will destroy the natural resources and their 
land. 
The people have made such persistent protests; 
complaining at both local and national government 
Jevel, ~t Forestry minister, Hasjrul Harahap, was 
forced m June to postpone Jogging activities and 
review the concession. The Catholic church have now 
taken up the isl~ders' case, issuing a strong Jetter of 
protest decrying the physical harassment 1Uld 
intimidation of the islanders [Jakarta Post, 16.09.9-2]. 
Apparently police in charge of securing the business 
interests of PT Alam Nusa Segar have been beating 
up islanders: "They have acted with iron hands and 
extra-judicialJy against the people they are supposed 
to protect", said Bishop Sol of Malub. During a 
protest on 14 September, police reportedly "bit 
kicked and even fired shots at the protesters". Around 
~ isJan~ were arrested, including a number of 
village chiefs accused of supporting 1he people. 
(Source: SKEPHI URGENT ACTION. September 
1992) , 
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W!EST PAPUA 
Freeport's dirty water 
,, 
Freeport's ever-expanding mining project in West Papua has displaced thousands of local Amungme 
people and deprived them of their rights to hunt, gather and even traverse their own land. Recent 
reports reveal that the sago groves of the Koperapoka people are being flooded as a result of 
Freeport's practices. 
Freeport is trying its hardest to promote an environmentally 
friendly image: after 18 years of production they decided in 
1990 to open a small environment department and to hire 
Ogilve & Mather, one of the world's largest public relations 
firms. In the spirit of openness, an Indonesian environ-
mental NGO, W ALHI, was allowed to visit the Freeport 
site in July 1991. However, at the last minute their visit 
was cut from ten days to a mere two. While W ALHI was 
deprived of a genuine inspection opportunity, evidence 
which has emerged which helps explain Freeport's sudden 
sensitivity. 
Natural dumping grounds 
Recent reports of independent visitors to the area testify to 
the crippling impact of Freeport's activities on the down-
stream environment. Enormous quantities of waste from the 
refining process at Tembagapura are apparently being 
deposited into the Ajikwa River, causing the flooding of 
forests which provide the Koperapoka with their livelihood. 
Twenty years ago, the throughput of Freeport's processing 
plant was 7 ,000 dry tons of ore a day. With its recent 
expansion to 52,000 dry tons/day, set to rise to 66,000 dry 
tons/day by mid-1993, the scale of Freeport's dumping 
practice is predictable. Waste disposal has always been a 
major problem in the mining industry, in terms of both bulk 
and environmental damage., The latter has been ignored by 
comparable mines at Ok Tedi and Panguna in Papua New 
Guinea where the environment is used as a dumping 
ground. 
There is no official Freeport information to suggest that 
the company deals with its waste any differently from Ok 
Tedi and Panguna. When Pa Vo (the Dutch-based Study and 
Information Centre on Papuan Peeples) asked Freeport to 
provide it with environmental impact data for the Grasberg 
mine, their request was turned down. Mining Magazine 
[March 1992) gives a supposedly detailed mineral process-
ing flowchart for the Freeport mill without any details of 
waste disposal! Freeport's vice-president for environmental 
affairs has modestly admitted that: "We can't do what we're 
doing here without some effects." [Southeast Asia Mining 
Letter, 22.5.1992). 
Downstream flooding 
The Koperapoka people living downstream of the site pay 
dearly for Freeport's negligence. The Ajikwa river is 
blocked, so that there is no flow at some points, as well as 
polluted by waste. The surrounding forests are flooded and 
the people's sago trees and trees used for canoes are leafless 
and dying. Some villagers have even had to move towards 
the coast to escape the flooding. Even Freeport has had to 
take drastic measures because of the flooding it has caused: 
an embankment has been built along a stretch of the Ajikwa 
River so as to prevent Freeport's town and airport at Timika • 
being flooded. The result? More flooding of the Kopera-
poka forests, where the floodwater is diverted. 
Social change a la Freeport 
In April 1992, the Jayapura-based newspaper, Tifa lrian, 
reported that Freeport's environment manager, Bruce Marsh, 
had told people in the Koperapoka area to stop eating sago. 
While Freeport hastily denied it, the Koperapoka themselves 
have confirmed independently that the reports were true. 
The US-based Rainforest Action Network reported in 
May that 78 drums had ·been distributed to Koperapoka 
families to catch rainwater for drinking, since the river 
water had been contaminated. Freeport responded by saying 
that the drums are designed "to store water so that the 
people do not have to collect water every day". It neglected, 
however, to invite RAN to see for itself. 
There may have been little point even if RAN had been 
invited. Previous visitors to the area have said they were 
accompanied by Freeport employees at all times and their 
schedule tightly arranged prior to their visit, denying them 
the chance to make a completely independent investigation. 
The company's own environmental studies will meanwhile 
be selectively reviewed by the Indonesian government. 
Freeport's attempts to improve its social and environ-
mental record are already losing credibility. However, the 
same cannot be said for the company's powerful friends. In 
April, Tifa Irian announced that the Indonesian government 
had said that "Any action against Freeport is against the 
government". • 
[Sources: Down to Earth No 18, RAN, PaVo Paper no.l, 
and independent sources.] 
PULPING THE RAINFOREST 
The rise of Indonesia's pulp and paper 
industry 
Avsllable from Down to Earth, 
lnternatJONll C.mpalon for Ecologlcal Just/~ In lndoneal• 
PO Box 213, London SES lLU, England. 
Price: £2.50/US $5.00 including p&p. £1/S2 extra for airmail. 
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ST PAPUA 
Indonesia and PNG preparing offensive? 
The intelJigence forces of Indonesia and Papua New Guinea 
are working to launch a joint campaign against the 
Organisasi Papua Merdeka, the armed resistance of the 
West Papuan people, according to a report received in 
Australia by the Australia-West Papua Association. 
The report suggests that on 12 August this year seven 
plane]oads of Indonesian troops were brought into Merauke, 
which borders with PNG in the south. The troops were fu]]y 
equipped for military action and were spread out, 175 
troops being placed in several sub-district viUages along 
the border: Bubul, Muting, Mindiptanah, Barokok (or 
Merokok) and Ok Sibil. 175 troops were also sent to 
Wamena district. 
At the time the report was sent, on 21 September, the 
Indonesian troops were said to be waiting for the PNG 
troops stiU involved in independence day celebrations. The 
PNG side would make air surveys from helicopters to track 
down OPM positions along the border. The joint operations, 
tht:. first of their kind and would represent a grave 
escalation in PNG's direct involvement in Indonesia's war 
against the OPM, are being carried out under the 
Memorandum of Understanding signed between the two 
countries for joint police patrols. 
The report claims that PNG troops wiU raid West Papuan 
refugee camps (presumably those near the border, not the 
East Awin camp) while Indonesian troops wiU engage in 
operations against OPM positions. 
The view from PN G 
In recent years, the stance of the PNG government towards 
its land-neighbour West Papua has become increasingly 
pro-Indonesian. Whereas in the early 1980s, it would 
respond angrily to border incursions from West Papua into 
PNG by Indonesian troops, in recent years it has gone as 
far as inviting Indonesian troops over the border to carry 
out "civic work" programmes. There was no outcry from 
Port Moresby last June when Indonesian troops crossed into 
Wutung in PNG in pursuit of the OPM, burning a man in 
his hut and injuring two others. 
On the other hand, many PNG citizens are very con-
cerned. The Wutung viJJagers have reported the June 
incident to the United Nations General Assembly "because 
the PNG government is not concerned about the iUegal 
crossings by the Indonesian soldiers" which left the vil-
lagers fearing to go out to their gardens [PNG Times, 
18.06.92). 
The Pacific Council of Churches has also condemned the 
incursions. In a statement in June, it said that the aggress-
ive and stubborn acts of border violations by Indonesian 
armed forces must be condemned by western countries 
[PNG Times, 18.06.92). 
Meanwhile the PNG Teachers Association is extremely 
concerned for the safety of teachers and students in schools 
on the border. The Association's general secretary, Moses 
Taian, recently criticised the border administration of PNG 
voicing the fear that "school children could possibly be 
caught one day in 'crossfire' between OPM rebels and · 
Indonesian troops" [Post Courier, 3.07.92). 
Sharing the same blood 
Many letters to the PNG press express dissatisfaction 
among citizens with their government's attitude. A typical 
Jetter says: "We share the same soil, we share the same 
blood. Why can't the PNG government fight for their 
rights? Maybe PNG is scared of the Indonesian Govern-
ment and its soldiers ... ". Another published on 16 June in 
the Post Courier, said: 
"We have been informed via the media that Indonesian 
soldiers will begin civic works projects in the Unggai-Bena 
area. Sounds harmless, doesn't it? 
"With the slow progress of the Trans-/rian Highway, the 
Indonesians now have a better excuse to have their planes 
"trespassing" in our country to drop off supplies. What 
right does an Indonesian have to enter PNG that a lone 
weary OPM man doesn't have? If Indonesians can enter 
PNG on job contracts, why not destroy all refugee camps 
and allow West Papuans, with or without papers, to be part 
of our society without so much hassle? 
''Admit it! Whether you1re from the West or the East, you 
are connected to this land by blood. Projects of such a 
nature can be handled by the youth of this nation under 
supervision from either the PNGDF [PNG Defence Force] 
or their Australian counterparts. Really, it is not necessary 
to take in Indonesian soldiers to do something we can 
handle ourselves. Perhaps there is something else? 
"It makes me sick to note that whilst we have alternatives 
the Government plunged right in without further and 
carefu.l consideration. How can we be friends with those 
who stole part of our land?" ~ 
West Papua: The 
Obliteration of a 
People 
The first two editions of this book 
appeared in 1983 and 1984. This 
third edition, published in response 
to continuing demand, has been 
substantially revised and updated, 
with new data on military operations, 
an appendix on the murder of the 
well-known West Papuan anthropol-
ogist, Arnold Ap, and recent informa-
tion about the exploitation of West 
Papua's natural resources. 
Published by Tapol, the 
Indonesia Human Rights 
Campaign. 160pp. 
Price: £3.50 Sterling 
plus postage 
Tapol, 111 Northwood Road, 
Thornton Heath, Surrey CR4 
8HW, UK 
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Sue Rabbitt Roff, Timor's Anschluss: Indonesian 
and Australian Policy in East Timor, 1974-
76,~992, The Edwin Mellen Press, 
Lewiston/Queenston/ Lo.mpeter. 128 pages. 
It goes ~ithout saying that many aspects of the history of 
Indonesia's brutal annexation of East Timor still need to be 
examined. The primary focus of this work is Australia's 
acquie~nce in this c_rlme a~a~st humanity. Early on, the 
accomphces were pnme m1msters Gough Whitlam and 
Malcolm Fraser, to be followed later by Bob Hawke and to~a.y, Paul Keating, each with their respective forei~ 
m1msters, the latest and worst of all being the current 
Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans. 
The author, an Australian, was in a good position to 
cJosely follow the events she records. She was on the staff 
of t~~ office set up in New York in December 1975 by 
Fretihn to lobby the United Nations in those crucial first 
months when two Security Council resolutions and a 
General Assembly resolution were adopted. These days, 
~hen the . UN has been used by the western powers to 
IDtervene ID so many world conflicts, it is salutary to be 
reminded of how difficult it was then for East Timor to 
obtain the active support of the UN against its aggressor. 
Among the many ironies that Roff s account reveals is the 
fact that Saudi Arabia "fully endorsed the Indonesian 
invasion of East Timor". Saddam Husein must have been 
listening! 
The story of how Australia deliberately sabotaged a visit 
in January 1976 by the UN Secretary-General's envoy 
Winspeare Guicciardi, to Fretilin-held territory for an on~ 
the-spot investigation in accordance with Security Council 
resolution 384, reveals the depth of Canberra's complicity 
in the crime being committed on its northern doorstep. 
Sever~] fir~t-hand accounts of the events immediate prior 
to the 1Dvas1on shed more light on events that have been 
recorded in other works. David Scott, an aid worker sent to 
East. ~imor. during the latter weeks of the Fretilin de facto 
admID1strahon (August-December 1975), vividly describes 
!he c~~ditions under which the last remaining Australians 
m D1h were compelled to leave in the countdown to 
invasion (the one who refused to go, journalist Roger East, 
was murdered on Day One of the invasiOn, 7 December 
1975). Another is the account by Jose Martins. He was 
leader of KOTA, one of the parties which signed away East 
Timor's future on 30 November 1975, and who a few 
months later, defected and described in detail Indonesian 
military operations inside East Timor in the months 
preceding the invasion. It was his account that first accused 
the Indonesian army of murdering the five members of a 
Australian TV team in Balibo on 16 October 1975. It is 
instructive to know that the so-called "Balibo Declaration" 
of East Timorese party leaders, used today by Jakarta as 
proof of "overwhelming support" in East Timor for 
integration, was signed at Pendena View Hotel in Bali, 
owned by Colonel Sugiyanto [misspelt throughout as 
Sugiyanta], of BAKIN, the lndonesian intelligence agency. 
The early chapters of the book are based largely on 
reports in the lndonesian press (almost exclusively, Sinar 
Harapan) in 1974 and 1975 on East Timor and Jakarta's 
contacts with Portuguese officials. The author argues that 
this press coverage meant that "it would have been difficult 
for Canberra's analysts to misunderstand lndonesia's 
intentions or to miss the build-up to the invasion". But far 
more telling than this are the confidential meetings she 
describes between Suharto and other top Indonesian 
officials, as well as between PM Whitlam and Australia's 
ambassador in Jakarta, Richard Woolcott who adopted what 
the latter called "Kissingerian pragmatism" - sympathising 
with Jakarta's objective in annexing the country while 
sa~ing they could not condone the means adopted, while 
doIDg nothing to condemn it. This hypocrisy has been the 
common thread of Australian policy to the present day, as 
re~~cted in the phoney . arguments employed by Foreign 
M1D1ster Gareth Evans to justify Australia's de jure 
recognition of integration. Canberra did not need to read the 
Indonesian press to know what was going on. It might have 
been mor.e useful for Roff to examine the Jakarta press for 
the way 1t served the government's purposes. For this she 
wo~ld have needed to look at more than just Sinar Harapan 
which was somewhat less compliant that other dailies. 
Of course, as Roff demonstrates, Australia's underlying 
consideration was oil, leading ultimately to the signing of 
the Timor Gap Treaty in December 1989. On the day 
Woolcott arrived in Jakarta to take up his post as 
ambassador, the Australian press reported that Woodside-
Burmah had begun drilling six miles off the coast of 
P?rtuguese T~~r. ~ne paper pointed out that a "major 
discovery of oil ID either part of Timor would bring a new 
element into the delicate questions surrounding the future 
of Portuguese Timor" (Australian Financial Review, 
4.03.1975). 
. Althou~h this ra~her slim hardback provides plenty of 
information not hitherto available, at £29.95 it is well 
beyond the pockets of most who might flDd it useful. And 
although so highly priced, it lacks an index, a bibliography 
and a glossary. Nor does it contain any note about the 
au!~or herse.lf. It ~so suffers from unbelievably bad sub-
ed1t1Dg: m1sspell1Dgs of numerous Portuguese and 
Indonesian names, many incorrect dates, words left out, 
some . sentences incomprehensible. Many acronyms are not 
expla1Ded; and who, may we ask, is "Head of lntemational 
Security Sudomo"? Presumably that should have been 
"internal security", in other words, Kopkamtib, which 
shou.Id have been spelt out, also identifying Sudomo as an 
admiral. Such errors are inexcusable. 
Roff intr~duces her book as an attempt at offering a 
reconstruction of events through the lndonesian press but 
there are so many misrepresentations of lndonesian 
personalities as to make one wonder how familiar she is 
with the lndonesian scene. 
E.ven worse, one ~f the photos is not what the caption 
cl~ims: the photo sa1~ to be ?'avier do Amaral (his name is 
misspelt throughout, ID a vanety of ways), first president of 
!he Democratic Republic, with a group of East Timorese, is 
ID fact a photo of a Papua New Guinea Catholic worker 
Greg M~ngi, . speaking t~ West Papuan refugees in Papu~ 
New ~u1Dea ID 1984, which was first published in TAPOL 
Bulletin. Books about East Timor are too few and far 
between to .be marred by such shoddy editing. * 
Carmel Budiardjo 
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BOOK REVIEW 
Tu Galala Social Change in the Pacific. Edited by 
Da.vid Robie. Bridget Williams Books & Pluto 
Press, P.O.Box 199, Leichhardt, NSW 2040, 
Australia. A$ 24.95 plus postage 
The timeliness of this excellent book, whose villains 
commit a host of crimes against the Pacific's people and 
environment, is highlighted by recent reports that France 
seems likely to resume its nuclear testing program at 
Moruroa Atoll in 1993. 
Apparently President Mitterand is close to abandoning his 
hopes for a global test ban and the French worshippers of 
'La Bombe' have already drilled a 700 metre deep bore-
hole in preparation for the next round of tests. 
"Tu Gala/a", a Fijian phrase meaning freedom, is a well ... 
argued response to a litany of regional outrages from the 
French and their colonies to the multinationals and their 
mining projects; from the strongarm tactics of Fiji's Rabuka 
to the Indonesian military in East Timor and West Papua 
(Irian Jaya). . 
Although the Indo-Fijian lawyer and journalist Richard 
Naidu writes in his Afterword that the volume is "mostly a 
polemic, or a diverse collection of them", the fifteen 
chapters are remarkably dispassionate and free of invective, 
considering the determination and track record of the 
adversaries. Doubtless this is largely due to the editorship 
of indefatigable New Zealand journalist David Robie who 
is at pains to stress that, unlike usual accounts of regional 
problems, "the 'voices' in this volume ... are in most cases 
activists, campaigners and writers who have been in the 
vanguard of change in the Pacific". He adds that they are 
the "advocates of the less privileged" and they have argued 
their cases well. It is of no little significance that many of 
them are nationals of the island states and their personal 
experiences of life in Kanaky (New Caledonia), Tonga, Fiji, 
Samoa, Aotearoa (NZ) and elsewhere provide fascinating 
and irrefutable insights into the Pacific beyond-picture-
postcards. 
The final impression is one of a polarised paradise where 
human rights are often the loser and the gap between haves 
and have-nots continues to widen. As the Tongan writer 
Epeli Hau'ofa puts it, "The privileged groups ... share a single 
dominant culture with increasingly marginalised local sub-
cultures shared by the poorer classes". , 
The Pacific might be, in the memorable words of a US 
military commander (and a book by Walden Bello et al) an 
"American lake", but Australia and New Zealand too, are a 
target of criticism. One main conclusion about our 'aid' to 
island nations is that development trends have been "turned 
toward economic and social integration within an Austra-
lasian-dominated regional economy". 
At least that is preferable to suffering under the Javanese 
jackboot, as researcher Liem Soei Liang from the London-
based TAPOL group explains in depressing detail. 
lnduded because of its location on the Pacific "Rim" and 
the Pacific characteristics of its eastern peoples, Indonesia 
is (as usual) the subject of much criticism, notably over its 
reprehensible behaviour in Timar and Irian, although little-
known problems in the Moluccan islands are also analysed. 
Liem, the co-author of several books on lndonesian politics 
has fused, and amplified, the Republic's ancient and modem 
history, his contribution well-placed in a book whose scope 
ranges as far afield as Tahiti from where the near legendary 
Danielssons pen an equally bleak portrait of living "In 
Bondage to the Bomb". 
ln regard to the East Timar invasion, Liem quotes Austra-
Jian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, as ~aving ~~~ that, 
''There is no legal obligation not to recogmse acqu1s1t1on of 
territory that was acquired by force" . 
How many negatives can one quote bear? . 
The rest of the un-pacific Pacific, we learn, 1s plagued by 
American deviousness in Belau; royal disregard in Tonga -
presumably the King is just too bus~ ~ating; and . a ~ost of 
such abuses as the PNG army's killing Bougamvilleans 
from Australian-supplied helicopters and a coalition of 
Fijian soldiers and chiefs deciding th~t their democracy 
needed a constitution that disenfranchised much of the 
electorate. 
If a single conclusion emerges it is that while the status 
quo is not about to change i~lf, there ~re, strong gras~­
roots movements that - to use Richard Naidu s words - will 
become "increasingly relevant to the needs of the region's 
peoples". . . . . 
He believes that when alternative political leadership 1s 
found in them it will lead to "real progress in our region". 
However it should be remembered that while many of these 
groupings may function legally, others - the Bougainville 
Revolutionary Army, Fretilin, the OPM and more - must 
choose bullets over ballots. 
[n doing so of course, they're fully in step with those 
European po~ers which established themselves here a 
century ago at the point of a musket. 
Robin Osborne, an Australian journalist, is author of 
Indonesia's Secret War: The Guerilla Struggle in Irian 
Jaya. He wrote this review for the Australian Joumalist.{c. 
Owing to rising costs of production and mailing, we 
have been forced to increase the subscription rate by 
£2.00. Concessionary rates continue to be available for 
students and the unwaged. 
We would also like to thank so many of our readers 
for their generous response to our appeal for funds. We 
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